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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
From March 2011, the conflict in Syria has come along a path of tumultuous evolution: from  
spontaneous popular uprising to  brutal civil war. There is no clear perspective for the conflict to end in 
the foreseeable future, particularly while many external actors are engaged in it. The situation in Syria 
and the circumstances that led to it are multi-layered and complex. The situation is dynamic to a point 
where establishing a full list of actors engaged in the conflict can present certain difficulties. The main 
intention of this paper is to describe the engagement of one specific non-state actor in the conflict: 
Hezbollah. The paper will attempt to investigate the relationship between the decision to enter  the 
conflict in relation to Hezbollah’s process of identity construction.  
 Identity and behaviour are not linked in a linear and unidirectional manner. During the course of 
my research on Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria the idea of mutuality and reciprocity in the relationship 
between the two elements came forward. This paper will connect a few interests: firstly in the 
phenomenon of foreign actors entering interstate conflicts, and secondly the role of identity in the 
decision-making process to engage in a foreign war. At the same time, it will  try to bring a new 
perspective in the already existing scholarship dealing with the motivations for external actors to enter 
the Syrian civil war. The emphasis will be on put on the constructivist perspective and issues of identity 
construction, that are understudied in the current scholarship on the topic and definitely omitted in the 
mass media coverage of the Syrian civil war. In addition, it will analyse the reciprocity between  identity 
construction and the decision to enter such a conflict. 
The main research question is to be posed as: How can we understand the reciprocal 
relationship between Hezbollah’s decision to step into the Syrian civil war on the one hand, and its 
identity construction on the other? How can we understand Hezbollah’s decision to enter the war in the 
context of its identity? How does the decision affect this group’s identity, which has been continuously 
constructed and re-constructed in the past 30 years? Can the conflict in Syria affect, or even re-shape 
the construction of Hezbollah’s identity? How does this comply (or disconnect) with Hezbollah’s own 
ideas about self and role in the serves in the region? As the motivations and perceptions of identity of 
the two actors engaged do not exist in the vacuum, the broader local-regional context will be taken into 
account. After establishing the influence that identity construction had on Hezbollah’s decision making, 
the paper will analyse the relationship between the two in the broader context of the Axis of Resistance, 
consisting of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. It will look closer at how this alliance has motivated some actions 
of Hezbollah in the past and what kind of influence could external factors have on the Party of God’s 
identity construction. 
 The scholarship has analysed possible motivations of Hezbollah for participating in the Syrian 
war, with examples of Joseph Alagha (Hezbollah and the Arab Spring), Joseph Daher (Hezbollah: The 
Political Economy of the Party of God) and multiple peer-reviewed articles analysing the situation in 
Syria with special focus on Hezbollah. None of them, however, looked closely at the identity construction 
of the group and how this can (or cannot) shed light on the decision to go into war. These perspectives, 
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moreover, seems to miss the link between the ongoing reconstruction of Hezbollah’s identity and the 
political decisions that it has been taking over the years – in the sense that as far as the suspicion of 
identity motivating the political decisions has been discussed, however the impact that political decisions 
taken by Hezbollah could have on its identity construction has not been brought up so much in the 
existing literature.  This paper will attempt to be a starting point for further discussion from this angle. 
 Hezbollah is certainly not the only non-state actor engaged in the conflict, and not the first one 
to be brought up both in media and academia - among others the one that catches most of the public 
opinion’s attention is definitely the so-called Islamic State1. However, Hezbollah is one of the longest 
operating, best established (with major international backing) and most combat-experienced non-state 
group engaged in the war. Its strong and intertwined international ties require an additional perspective 
on organisation’s possible motivations coming both from within and from the outside – therefore the 
broader dynamics of the international relations of the Middle East need to be touched upon in order to 
grasp a full picture. 
 The identity of international actors is not fixed: it is in a constant flux, and changes to it are 
conditioned by both external and internal circumstances. The long process that took Hezbollah from 
being a radical, anti-establishment, Iran-sponsored guerrilla group participating in the Lebanese civil 
war, to the widely popular political party with a cross-sectarian and cross-class support base, was 
motivated both by the changes within the organization as by the changes in the environment around it. 
The thesis will analyse both internal factors – such as the changes in the Lebanese political landscape 
and the tumultuous domestic events of the past 30 years – and external circumstances, such as 
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Axis of Resistance and its continuous engagement in the resistance 
against Israel. 
The involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis is placed in the regional context of the alliance 
known both in the scholarship as well as in the mass media as the Axis of Resistance. Its primary actors 
with the strongest mutual ties are Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Understanding the presence of Iranian 
forces and Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war is crucial to picture the conflict as a whole. It matters 
especially in a broader context of regional relations dynamics, given the fact that the Axis, and 
particularly the relationship between Syria and Iran, has been one of the most unprecedented and 
persistent alliances in the Middle East: 
 
„Generally speaking, there are three important reasons why the nexus between the two deserves 
attention: First, their alliance has had a significant impact on Middle East politics since 1979. Second, it 
has proven to be an enduring relationship, that has now lasted 30 years, which is extraordinary when 
one takes into account the volatility of the Middle East and its shifting political sands. Third, in certain 
respects many regional and political observers still misunderstand the alliance”2 
 
                                                          
1 The so called Islamic State will be referred to as IS in this paper. 
2 Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (New 
York/London: IB Tauris, 2009), XI. 
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In the recent years, the Axis has exerted both symbolic and real power and influence on the Syrian civil 
war. Hezbollah has its own special power relationship with Syria, and this paper will investigate how this 
balance of power between the two actors (or lack of thereof), and their shared perceptions of threat, 
might have motivated the Party of God’s decision to go to war.  
 The structure of the thesis is as follows as follows: after explaining the methodological 
framework on the conception of identity in the international relations and foreign policies, it will go onto 
analysing Hezbollah’s identity and the transformations it has undergone during organisation’s active 
years. Furthermore, it will attempt to place Hezbollah’s and its identity conceptions in the context of Axis 
of Resistance: the analysis will focus on looking at dynamics between the sides in the last 30 years. 
From this point, the paper will attempt – based on available sources – to assess the level of Hezbollah 
engagement into the conflict in Syria and try to determine possible motivations. It will also investigate 
how the event of the Syrian civil war could have influenced the identity construction of the Party of God. 
Asking about Hezbollah’s reasons for entering the Syrian conflict, the paper will try to evaluate the 
possible decision-making process in relation to the previously studied identity construction. The paper 
will also look into the question of sectarianism and its role in the Axis of Resistance – trying to answer 
the question whether real or perceived religious sentiments have that much influence over general 
foreign policy decisions. 
 There are some limitations to this study. First of all, the time scope – the critical portion of the 
study will focus on documented Hezbollah’s actions in Syria from 2011 to 2016. Moreover, it is unfeasible 
to thoroughly track the decision making process for all three actors in the alliance – most of the 
documents in this regard are not available to the public. However, the material is still sufficient enough 
to draw some meaningful hypothesis about the motivations behind Hezbollah’s foreign policy decision-
making and to apply the constructivist approach towards identity in the foreign policy to contribute to a 
broader analysis of international relations in the region in the past few years. It should be a solid starting 
point for developing study on this topic in the future. 
 There is one important point that this paper will not attempt to explain thoroughly, however it is 
still worth mentioning – the eagerly discussed “sectarian” explanation that is used to justify the long-
lasting relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah (referring to the alliance as the “Shiite Crescent”). 
This study will argue that it is not religion that ties these three actors together – and, in fact, after taking 
a closer look it might turn out that their approaches towards religion will be quite dissonant – but it is 
their own perceptions of interest and threat that will matter the most in the end. Given the specific 
national (or group, in case of Hezbollah) identities of three actors, it will be worth looking at how religion 
can be used as a tool in justifying particular actions and operationalizing policies – however primary 
legitimisation will come from particular identities and particular interests that feed them. 
 To sum up, Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict is a fact, however explanations for it 
both in scholarship and in the mass media are too focused on strategic considerations. The motivations 
behind the civil strife need to be analysed not only from a strategic standpoint, but also from the angle 
of identity construction and its influence on the decision-making process. This study is an attempt to 
bring more attention to this issue and possibly be a starting point for discussing Syria’s future – in 
particular how dependent on external actors it might become. It will do so through analysis of possible 
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motivations behind Hezbollah’s engagement and how that corresponds with the local alignment of 
alliances, in particular with dynamics of the “Axis of Resistance”. 
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The methodology of the paper is a desk-based study, conducted at the Leiden University and 
the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. The study will use academic publications such as 
books, peer-reviewed journals and the available intelligence reports and press releases. The study is at 
the inter-section of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies, in terms of theories and 
methodology drawing mainly from the IR scholarship on the topic; it will also draw from the foreign policy 
analysis used in the International Relations. 
 Theoretical basis for the analysis is rooted primarily in the constructivist conceptions of foreign 
policies and international relations, with particular focus on identity issues and threat perceptions of 
particular actors. Constructivism posits that international structures are alloyed with normative and 
material elements, that social structures constitute actors’ identities and interests, and that the practices 
of actors embedded in that social structure not only reproduce the structure but also sometimes 
transform it.3 Identity is a crucial factor in the analysis of this situation, primarily because: 
 
“… [national] identity is a source of interests. Identity, however, does not cause action but rather makes 
some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so.”4 
 
 There is no single agreement in the scholarship on what identity’s definition is in the first place, 
and how it affects the foreign policy decisions. For the purpose of this paper, definition of identity will be 
taken from Wendt’s analysis, being: 
 
“… [identity is] a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions. 
(…) identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings”5 
 
Wendt goes onto establishing 4 types of identities: 1) personal or corporate, 2) type, 3) role and 4) 
collective. In case of this study, the identity that Wendt ascribes to states – personal/corporate – will be 
a starting point for analysing Hezbollah’s self-perceptions and the motivations that are rooted in them. 
As Wendt points out, people (and by analogy – states) are distinct entities in virtue of biology, but without 
consciousness and memory – a sense of “I” – they are not agents6. Therefore, the most important 
conclusion coming from this definition of identity is that the actor needs to have an understanding of 
“Self” and in order to accomplish that it might place itself against the “Other” (this is particularly important 
in case of Hezbollah and its “resistance” identity).  
                                                          
3 Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002) 4. 
4 Michael Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable”, in: Identity and 
Foreign Policy in the Middle East, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca/London: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 63. 
5 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224. 
6 Ibid. 
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 As Mark Lynch describes it, identity is in the constant process of being contested and challenged 
(in his example primarily by the public sphere7). Identity cannot be understood as a given and cannot 
be “fixed” – what we can observe in actors such as states and non-state groups is rather an evolution 
of identities dependent on both internal and external circumstances.  
This study is based on the assumption of the constant flux of identity – especially in the case of 
Syrian war. As mentioned above, identity is a subject of continuous contestation and change – however 
it needs a particular trigger, a sort of “breaking point” to start an overturn/major change in its core.  
Significant internal or inter-state conflicts can serve as such breaking points from which a new identity 
will arise. The wave of the Arab Uprisings of 2011 can be treated as such a breaking point, from which 
a need for new definitions has emerged. It also proves further that identity is in a flux, and that particular 
decisions and external events can be also a justification for a particular shift in the actor’s identity. 
Uprisings of 2011 had provided a momentum that introduced major change in actors identities, 
self-definitions and, as a consequence, in the regional inter-state relations. For Syria however, this 
momentum has become a prolonged civil war. In its face, both Syria as a state and  each actor that got 
involved into this situation must have confronted the decision to join the war with its own particular 
identities. This is the point where it will be crucial to look at Hezbollah’s identity formation and its 
transformation in the event of Syrian war – since engagement in the neighbouring country domestic 
troubles definitely did not comply with the Party of God’s main identity pillar of being resistance 
movement against Israel in the name of the Lebanese people. Therefore, on the identity level, the study 
attempts to confront the construction of Hezbollah’s identity with the decision-making behind entering 
the Syrian war.  
 Identity forms the backdrop to the formation of conceptions of threat, opportunity and interests8. 
It is important to remember, however, that interests cannot simply be derived from identity, any more 
than they can be directly derived from international structure or economic concerns9. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of identity will be crucial to understanding how Hezbollah and other Axis of Resistance actors 
define their interests, and why did these interests feel threatened by the outburst of Syrian civil war.  
 The idea of “self”, the identity of the actor can determine who is perceived as a friend, and who 
is seen as an enemy. In realist theory of IR, these distinctions are made based on the balance of power 
and “objective” threat that a lack of such balance may create, however in case of Syria and Hezbollah 
the causality needs to be analysed differently. Definitions are needed to fully grasp the context and 
explain the reasoning. Threat is defined as a situation in which one agent or a group has either the 
capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group10. Threat perception, 
however, is a function of the line drawn between the “self” and the “other”11. Therefore, what a group 
                                                          
7 Marc Lynch, “Jordan’s Identity and Interest” in: Barnett and Telhami (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy…, 25. 
8 Ibid., 26. 
9 Ibid. 
10 David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power and Threat Perception: A Cross-National 
Experimental Study”, Journal of conflict resolution, vol. 51(5) (October 2007), 745. 
11 Ibid., 749. 
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perceives as a threat to its existence/interests, is tightly related to its identity and ideas that accompany 
it. The “stranger” the other, the bigger threat it poses to the “self12.  
 Thus, identity is crucial to assessing threats. What the actor sees as a threat is strongly 
connected to how it sees itself. This dependence has been described as “socio-cultural explanation of 
threat perception”13. According to it, domestic society and its accompanying identities influence how a 
state’s decision makers perceive threat – identity prevails over the realist perception of power balance, 
hence the latter becomes less relevant.14 Changing of circumstances may trigger the change in threat 
perception. One of the critical signals that elevates threat perceptions is the breaking of norms15. In the 
case investigated by this paper, such breaking of norms appeared when previously stable and 
predictable Syrian regime had become severely undermined by the popular uprising. This event has 
disturbed its closest allies – Hezbollah and Iran – and caused them to step into what seemed to be at 
first domestic conflict. There is additional level to this “breaking of norms”; the common identity of the 
alliance has been threatened, since the regime overthrow in Syria could not guarantee keeping up the 
policies it used to conduct towards Iran and Hezbollah.  
Moreover, and this also ties up to the issue of identity – actors identify threats more in relation 
to the stability of their own regimes rather than to material factors such as military capabilities or 
proximity16. There is one more question arising from the issue of threat perception: as Gregory Gause 
notices, states (and other actors) do not face threats in a one-at-a-time manner. Especially in the Middle 
East, actors face multiple threats at a time: they need to omnibalance (term borrowed from the neorealist 
approach in the IR), or so to say – prioritise between them17. Hence, this study is looking at yet another 
research question – why did Hezbollah prioritise the threat of Syrian regime collapse over the threat of 
Israel, or over the threat of potential domestic unrest?  
 Therefore, two factors are intertwined: the identity of Hezbollah as a group and the threat that 
the possible regime overthrow in Syria can present to it. Such a threat constitutes a “breaking point” for 
Hezbollah’s identity, which needs to be adapted to the new circumstances and its perception of self may 
need to undergo a significant reconstruction in order to achieve the credible shift in its identity. This 
paper will attempt to answer what kind of threat perceptions might have had motivated the decision of 
Hezbollah to engage in the Syrian civil war, what is the actors’ identity’s influence on the decision-making 
connected to these threats and how these threat perceptions can impact the reconstruction of an identity 
of the actor. 
  
 
 
                                                          
12 Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, 751. 
13 Janice Gross Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations” in: Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, Jack S. 
Levy (eds)., The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 373. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 374. 
16 F. Gregory Gause III, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf”, Security Studies 
13:2 (Winter 2003), 274. 
17 Ibid., 282. 
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2. HEZBOLLAH’S IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND ITS ROLE IN LEBANESE POLITICS 
 
 The following section will go through Hezbollah’s identity establishment and the changes it 
underwent during the years of its political activity in the domestic context. It will shortly discuss the 
circumstances of founding the Hezbollah and analyse how they influenced the organizations identity 
construction. It will focus on recurring themes in Hezbollah’s identity and what reinterpretations in the 
domestic context, together with stages that Hezbollah went through as a political organisation in 
Lebanon. The central point of analysis will be the question of how Hezbollah’s identity construction might 
have influenced its decision to enter the Lebanese politics and become a prominent actor in the domestic 
scene. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ORGANISATION 
 
 Hezbollah as a military political organisation was established in 1982, in response to the ongoing 
civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of the country that happened the same year. The impulse 
for creating an armed force, however, was not motivated exclusively by the attack of a foreign power. 
The mobilisation of the Lebanese Shi’a was motivated partly because of the few decades of a growing 
feeling of disenfranchisement among their community: they considered themselves to be under severe 
discrimination in comparison to other confessional groups in the country18. Thanks to the activities of 
the new generation of Shi’a clerics, among them Musa al-Sadr, the establishment of collective 
consciousness and mobilisation of the Shi’a community (and operational Shi’a identity) was possible19 . 
 The first organised Shi’a force in Lebanon was Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, the 
battalions of Lebanese resistance), which has been an armed branch of the first Shi’a political 
organisation, Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of Disinherited), established in 1974 by a young cleric 
Musa al-Sadr20. These organisations were an effect of the generation change in the Shi’a clergy 
happening from the 1970s: the traditional Shi’a religious leadership was losing its influence, while at the 
same time the young clerics were gaining extensive followers base and inspiring a tenfold increase in 
the numbers of Shi’a clergy at the time21. This wave of Shi’a political mobilisation was a welcoming 
environment for a new force, which was to grow to be a much more radical actor than Amal (and in this 
way gaining more popular support). The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr in 1978 during his trip to Libya 
added up to the growing discontent and confusion within the Lebanese Shi’a community22, strengthening 
their motivation to get organized and fight for its right in the Lebanese scene. This event also allowed 
Hezbollah to rise to power with a new Shi’a leadership and contribute to recreation of Shi’a identity.  
                                                          
18 Dominique Avon, Jane Marie Todd, Anais-Triss Khatchadourian, Hezbollah: A History of Party of God 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012), 15. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid., 16. 
22 Ibid., 23. 
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Hezbollah came into living in very particular conditions of a civil war, in which a few external 
actors were present as well: on top of a growing Syrian intervention into Lebanese domestic issues 
(turning into full-fledged occupation), the 1982 brought about the Israeli invasion. The Syrian 
government made its status official only a year after the civil war in Lebanon started, with the 1976 
Constitutional Document23. Shortly after, the military intervention - under the name of “Arab 
Peacekeeping Force” (later on it changed to “Arab Force of Dissuation”)24- reinforced Syrian power 
position in the country.  This power shift transformed Lebanon from the country “with an Arab face” to 
an explicitly Arab state25, which was not a satisfying shift for all the Lebanese communities who did not 
subscribe to the Syrian pan-Arabist ideology. This already strained domestic situation was worsened by 
the 1982 Israeli invasion, which divided the fighting Lebanese factions even further26. 
Even though the exact moment of Hezbollah’s establishment cannot be properly traced27, there 
three most popular “decisive moments” associated with it: victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, 
the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr in 1978 or the Israeli operation Litani (in 1978, 4 years before the 
1982’s Peace for Galilee): all three events happened within a scope of 2 years and were quite influential 
on the Shi’a sense of community. After the Iranian revolution, many Lebanese Shi’a a new spiritual 
leader for their underprivileged society in Imam Khomeini28. It was around the period between 1978 and 
1979 that an influential Lebanese Shi’a cleric, Abbas al-Musawi, has founded “The Hezbollah of 
Lebanon” together with his students and a group of ulama’ (scholars)29 – the organisation of the more 
academic nature. Hezbollah, the armed group as we know it today, made its first public statement in 
1985 with the Manifesto, called also the Open Letter. 
The 1982 Israeli invasion Peace in Galilee was the momentum that Hezbollah needed to come 
into light and begin the activity of a new armed political force in Lebanon. It has defined itself as an 
Islamic jihadi movement, conducting resistance activities to Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon30. 
Therefore, Hezbollah’s primary incentive to come to life came from the external actor: its activities, 
however, in the end focus more on Lebanon. This chapter, therefore, will elaborate more on the identity 
that influenced its accommodation into the domestic political scene and how these local circumstances 
induced some shifts in the organisation’s perception of itself. The chapter will analyse the evolution of 
Hezbollah’s position over the years in Lebanon and will look into the recurring themes in its identity that 
were reinterpreted in the domestic arena in the past 30 years.  
 There are two primary sources that describe Hezbollah’s self-perception – the 1985 Open Letter 
and the 2009 Manifesto. Both texts will be extensively used in the analysis in order to trace the evolution 
of identity construction over the years and the discourse that Hezbollah created around its activity in 
Lebanon. It will look also into interpretation and reinterpretation of the recurring themes.  
                                                          
23 Avon et al., 18 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Avon et al., 21. 
27 Ibid, 22. 
28 Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 19. 
29 Ibid, 20. 
30 Ibid. 
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2.1. BASIC NOTIONS OF HEZBOLLAH’S IDENTITY 
 
 The set of particular circumstances surrounding the birth of Hezbollah as a political group in 
Lebanon surely had critical influence on the way the Party of God defined itself. The events happening 
in Lebanon at the time and the actors involved in them are of crucial importance to the formation of 
organisation’s identity, especially in context of theoretical framework in which identity is inherently 
relational31. Actors define themselves by who does belong to the group and – most importantly – who 
does not, and political actors define themselves through interactions with other actors32. Hezbollah 
emerged as a group in face of hostile interaction – Israel’s military intervention, henceforth it began 
creating its identity in relation to this event and in contrast to the attacking actors. Therefore, it created 
what Castells calls “resistance identity”: it was defining itself against another actor; by definition, 
resistance identity -  
 
“… is generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devaluated and or stigmatized by the 
logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different 
from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society.”33 
 
 Hezbollah, therefore, had been addressing the question of oppression and resistance, which 
had an influence on it as a social movement34. 
 Identity definition proposed by Wendt – “a property of intentional actors that generates 
motivational and behavioural dispositions. (…) a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-
understandings”35 – combined with Alagha’s concept of resistance identity is an accurate theoretical 
framework to apply to Hezbollah’s identity construction process. As the primary motivation of Hezbollah 
to appear was to stand in opposition to an external, foreign threat – and multiple domestic threats – the 
resistance and differentiation from other actors naturally became the pillar of its self-understanding. 
Topics of unity and cooperation were quite secondary in the identity construction of the group36. 
 Another pillar that emerged in the construction of Hezbollah’s identity was religion – referring to 
Shi’a branch of Islam. This was conditioned primarily by the confessional nature of Lebanon’s political 
arena; in addition to that, the previously mentioned political mobilisation of the Shi’a community 
contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah as a Shi’a actor. Nevertheless, the Party of God was not 
exclusively dedicated to achieving objectives that would benefit only the Shi’a community – in invested 
a lot of energy in encouraging all the Muslims to reach the ultimate goal: creation of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon. This was the priority objective both in religious and political terms37. Hezbollah was vocally 
                                                          
31 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, 24. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid., 25. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Wendt, 224. 
36 On the inclusive nature of Hezbollah and its allies see later in this paper.  
37 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, 22. 
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against an idea, proposed in the 1980s, of dividing Lebanon into religious cantons, with Hassan 
Nasrallah stating that 
 
“…the Muslims have no right whatsoever to even entertain the idea of a Muslim canton, a Shi‘ite canton, 
or a Sunni canton… Talking about cantons annihilates the Muslims, destroys their potential power, and 
leads them from one internal war to another. Only the Islamic state upholds their unity”38. 
 
 These two crucial concepts – pan-Islamism (important: with very few explicit references to the 
Shi’a branch of Islam) and resistance (understood both as resistance against Israel and as a general 
anti-establishment policy approach) have become the pillars of Hezbollah’s identity at its beginning and 
went through multiple reinterpretations over the years. These notions were present both in domestic, as 
well as international discourse of the organisation. The organisation was focused on local goals, but 
with the global perspective in mind: instating the Islamic state in Lebanon was supposed to be the first 
step in the establishment of a broader Islamic order in the Middle East.  
 Over the time, however, the direction of Hezbollah’s postulates in this regard had shifted: the 
Party of God focused more on becoming an influential actor in the Lebanese political arena. Hezbollah 
spent substantial part of the 1990s trying to prove that it had never wanted to become a state within a 
state; it dedicated significant resources to re-structuring its identity in a way that that it maintained its 
pillars, but also focused on tailoring it towards appealing more to the voters of Lebanon. The calls for an 
immediate instalment of the Islamic state in Lebanon turned into calling for the establishment of such in 
the indefinite future39, while for the time being considering multi-sectarian nature of Lebanon as an asset, 
not as an obstacle40. Hezbollah went as far as to claim that they never were a party in the civil war and 
had not attempted trying to convince other people to their ideology41. During the 1990s the Party of God 
has worked on the bottom-up Islamisation, which concentrated on providing social services and working 
through grass-root organisations and NGOs. Hezbollah has used already existing administrative and 
infrastructural constructions to put its ideology through and gather political capital and local community 
support42.  
 Thanks to these activities, in the first decade of 21st century Hezbollah has become a dominant 
political power in Lebanon. It dropped the jihad rhetoric from its official discourse and focused on 
incorporating also other sects in its political endeavours (Sunnis and Christians could have been found 
on Hezbollah’s electoral ballots over the years43). Hezbollah has adjusted its policies to Lebanese 
politics’ specifics44 and gained the veto power in the Lebanese cabinet.  Moreover, despite its known 
                                                          
38 Alagha, Hizbullah Identity Construction, quoting Nasrallah, 23. 
39 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, (Pluto Press: University of Virgina, 2002), 16. 
40 Alagha, Hizbullah Identity Construction, 23. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Krista E. Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 32:8 (2009), 673. 
43 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, 24. 
44 Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Pallas 
Publications – Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 13. 
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ties to Syria and Iran45, it proved its capability of an independent decision-making process and policy -
shaping.  
 Following this overview, this chapter will focus on elaborating on crucial concepts in Hezbollah’s 
identity formation: resistance and Islamism: it will investigate its incorporation into Lebanese politics 
(“Lebanonization”). It will analyse in greater detail the role that Hezbollah has played in the domestic 
scene. It will also look into the questions of pan-Islamism and religious affiliation; in the end, it will ask 
whether these perceptions of resistance and religion had influence on the decision-making in the 
domestic scene in the past 30 years.  
 
2.2. RESISTANCE: THE OPPRESSORS AND THE OPPRESSED 
 
As mentioned above, the foundation of Hezbollah’s identity construction from the onset of its 
activity has been resistance. This angle of organisation’s ideology is tightly connected to the influence 
that the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran had on Lebanese Shi’a community and to the Israeli 
invasion in Lebanon. The temporal coincidence of 1979 Iranian revolution, 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and the civil strife that has been tormenting the country since 1975 formed crucial 
circumstances for the birth of Hezbollah’s identity, which lead it to putting resistance as its primary goal 
and characteristic. These circumstances had also a substantial impact on the formation of Self and 
Other in Hezbollah identity structure, and how this contraposition between the two concepts would be 
produced and represented. It will delve into detail into the definitions of the concepts that were put 
forward in the 1985 Open Letter, therefore the definitions that Hezbollah used at the onset of its activity.  
 Wendt posits that “what really distinguishes the (…) identity of intentional actors (…) is a 
consciousness and memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity”; a particular “Other” is 
needed for determining the “Self”46. In case of Hezbollah, the consciousness and memory of Self has 
been created on the grounds of Shi’a identity and its feeling of severe discrimination and mistreatment 
in Lebanese community, resulting in political mobilisation47. In addition, this sense of self has been 
strengthened by the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, where Shi’a community rose to power and quite 
abruptly became a major actor in both international and regional arena. However, in order to strengthen 
the feeling of belonging for its prospective members, Hezbollah has focused on the “Other” that posed 
the biggest threat to the survival of the community: the Other was found on three levels: regional - the 
invader (Israel), global - the imperialism (embodied by the United States) and domestic - conflicting 
Lebanese sects.  
 The 1985 Open Letter’s outlines founding principles of Hezbollah, namely: “…the constituents 
of the Party’s political ideology: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic State; relations with Christians; anti-
Zionism; pan-Islamism; anti-imperialism; and jihad and martyrdom”48. The Party of God adopts the 
dichotomy of the “oppressors” and the “oppressed”, characteristic for Marxism and invoked in the Iranian 
                                                          
45 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 13. 
46 Wendt, 225. 
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revolution as well. Nevertheless, Hezbollah does not refer to the concept of the “oppressed” in the basic 
Marxist understanding of the poor peasants and proletariat, it employs the more inclusive concept 
referring to an existential level of oppression: lack of freedom and dignity, unjust treatment, tyranny, 
impoverishment; regardless of class, religion and cultural background49. However, despite the 
inclusivity, the concept itself is formulated in a way that can be referred directly – but never explicitly – 
to Lebanese Shi’a in the South and the Shi’a community in general.50 The fight against the oppressor is 
tightly connected to the fact that Hezbollah is acting in the name of Islam: the resistance is inherently 
Islamic in Hezbollah’s view, in a way that it fulfils the obligation of the Islamic jihad. The act or resistance 
is equalled to the act of striving in the cause of God and Islam51. Resistance is also described as a moral 
duty of the oppressed who strive for the liberation from their oppressors:  
 
“… resistance becomes a ‘humanitarian’ and ‘moral’ duty which all members of society, whether Muslim 
or otherwise, are obliged to undertake. The party acknowledges the existence of this moral element in 
its jihad with Israel, when it claims that ‘the Resistance is spurred by humanitarianism and the defence 
of the land’. Nonetheless, ‘our religious ideology is the first of its [the Resistance’s] conditions’ – an 
affirmation which underlines the religious underpinnings and essentially Islamic character of Hezbollah’s 
resistance”52 
 
 The primary factor necessary for the establishment of Hezbollah’s resistance identity is the 
definition of the “Other”. Who are the “oppressors”, the enemies of Hezbollah and how does it influence 
Hezbollah’s identity construction? 
 The first and most important “Other” is Israel. In the Open Letter, Hezbollah is quite 
straightforward in its approach to Israel and its inhabitants53, describing them as “… an aggressive, 
racist, expansionist, anti-humanist, cancerous gland instated by Western colonial powers in the Muslim 
heartland”54. Israel is never acknowledged as a legitimate state: it is referred to as an “Entity” and 
Hezbollah sees no option to ever make peace with it: 
 
 
 
“That is why our confrontation with this Entity will only cease when it is completely obliterated from the 
face of the Earth. From this perspective, we do not recognize any ceasefire, truce, or peace treaty with 
it, whether arrived at by individual states or communally.”55 
                                                          
49 Alagha: Hizbullah’s Documents , 16. 
50 Saad-Ghorayeb, 15-16. 
51 Ibid., 122. 
52 Ibid., 126. 
53 There is an argued contradiction between Hezbollah’s declared respect for the people of the Book (which 
should include the Jews) and the actual treatment of Jewish Israelis – with argument for conflating Jewish, 
Israeli and Zionist identities – on it see: Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents…, 19. 
54 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents…, 19. 
55 Open Letter, as quoted in Alagha, in Hizbullah’s Documents…, 48 (all the quotes from the Open Letter and 
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 This kind of discourse allows no space for a compromise. By analogy, all other actors who 
collaborate with Israel or at least acknowledge its statehood are described as treacherous (defeatist) 
and are accused of inflicting harm to the Muslim umma. In terms of identity formation on the most basic 
level – Hezbollah’s existence in the shape that it emerged in 1982 is justified primarily by the existence 
of Israel. The Party of God is established in order to eradicate the Jewish State from the maps of the 
Middle East; this goal defines the entire purpose of Hezbollah’s being. The remaining “Others” and the 
consequences related to that exist only in relation to the first one.  
 Due partly to its enmity to Hezbollah’s greatest ally – Iran – and partly due to the support it has 
been expressing towards Israel over the years, another “Enemy”, or “the Other” for Hezbollah is the 
United States. Section 3 of the Open Letter is explicitly titled “America is behind all our catastrophes”56. 
The section starts with very uncompromising description of Hezbollah’s approach towards the US: 
 
“We are dedicated to fighting and uprooting vice and debauchery… The first root of vice is America (…) 
They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries, 
and appointed rulers who committed the worst massacres against our umma. Those rulers do not cease 
to support the allies of Israel; they do not allow us the right of self-determination.”57  
 
 Thus, in Hezbollah’s view, there are two external “Others”, against whom the resistance must 
be conducted: the United States as the main evil, and Israel as a regional proxy fulfilling American 
policies in the Middle East (yet positing a more direct threat to Lebanon and Hezbollah). In Hezbollah’s 
view, taking the United States out of the picture would make it significantly harder for Israel to maintain 
its powerful position in the Middle East, and would make it harder for it to survive as a state. These two 
allies are unbreakably intertwined in Hezbollah’s discourse, since the support of the United States (who, 
in Hezbollah’s view, is manipulating the entire international community) for Israel is constant, and it led 
to the misery of the Palestinians, and thus all the Arabs and Muslims in the region. Against this “evil”, 
the Islamic umma (represented by Hezbollah) is opposed. Analogically, any entity or group cooperating 
with the United States or Israel can become the enemy of Hezbollah by proxy. For example, all the 
international organisations that include the United States are also perceived as hostile to Hezbollah  – 
e.g. NATO is dubbed a “wolf” in the Open Letter58.  
Based on the same analogy, in the domestic scene the Phalange (a predominantly Maronite 
militia) had become Hezbollah’s arch enemy, due to their participation in the massacres of Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps and well known collaboration with both the United States and Israel. 
Consequently, the country’s Maronite-dominated government is called “the Lebanese defeatists”59, 
which shows Hezbollah’s unfavourable attitude towards the institution of the Lebanese state as such. In 
addition, the Party postulated creation of the Islamic state in Lebanon, based on the example of the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran60. Moreover, Hezbollah was against opposition in Lebanon, since it conforms 
with the structure imposed by the Maronite government and henceforth acts from a “scarecrow 
position.”61   
 In short, at the foundation of Hezbollah’s identity lay its enemies; they define the organisation’s 
objectives in the domestic scene: 
 
“We are now in a state of progressive confrontation with our foes, until we achieve the following goals 
1)   To expel Israel (IDF) for good from Lebanon, as a prelude to its total annihilation, and the 
liberation of Jerusalem and its holy cities from the occupation; 
2) To expel the Americans, the French, and their allies from Lebanon for good, thus rooting out 
any influence of any colonial power on Lebanon; 
3) To submit the Phalangists to just rule, and make them stand trial for the crimes they have 
committed against Muslims and Christians, through encouragement from America and Israel; 
4) To allow our populace the right of self-determination; to freely choose the political system that 
they aspire to. We do not hide our commitment to (the rule of) Islam, and we invite everybody 
to choose the Islamic system (of government/governance), which alone is capable of 
guaranteeing justice and dignity to everyone, thus preventing any colonial attempt to invade our 
country again”.62 
 
Hezbollah’s identity construction is founded on a way it perceives its enemies and how it identifies the 
threat they pose to its existence. Therefore, the core concepts of Hezbollah’s identity are motivated from 
the outside of the organisation, however how the party presents them and reinterprets them in the future 
is not dependent on the external actors. 
Even though Hezbollah has defined the United States as its arch enemy and the source of all 
evil, the Party of God’s goals – at least the ones presented in the Open Letter – have a domestic priority 
over the global outreach. Even though the organisation was quite explicitly talking about the global scope 
of the Islamic revolution it wanted to be a part of, in the end it focused more on a domestic scene. From 
the very beginning, even though the terrorist acts conducted abroad had a goal of primarily drawing 
attention to the civil war in Lebanon, the mistreatment of the Shi’a community and last but not least, the 
Israeli occupation.  
Hezbollah and its resistance project was not only limited to the external “Others” who defined 
its identity: the resistance was also targeted against the unjust sectarian system of rule that was 
governing in Lebanon from 1943.  
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2.3. HEZBOLLAH AS A POLITICAL PARTY: FROM TOTAL REFUSAL TO ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 Hezbollah started out as an organisation that deeply despised the Lebanese confessional 
system and the sectarianism in the country. The at the time ruling Maronite establishment was seen as 
traitors. The perception of the “oppressiveness” of the state of Lebanon did not stem from the un-Islamic 
nature of the Lebanese state, but from its “fundamentally oppressive” configuration which was founded 
on the Maronite community’s political supremacy63. The institutionalised hegemony of Maronites, based 
on the outdated social census from the 1940s, produced the depiction of it as ‘a rotten sectarian 
system’.64 The cooperation happening between the Maronite government and the Israel was also a 
trigger for Hezbollah’s contempt of the Christian community in Lebanon. 
It is not of a surprise, then, that the section 5 of the Open Letter is explicitly titled “The Zionist-
Phalangist coordination”: 
 
“The Zionist occupation continued to rape the lands of the Muslims till it succeeded in occupying two-
thirds of Lebanon. All this in full coordination with the Phalangists who condemned all attempts to resist 
the invading forces. The Phalangists took part in executing Israeli plans and policies so that they could 
be rewarded with the seat of the presidency in Lebanon.”65 
 
 The Phalange has collaborated with Israel and contributed to the massacres of Sabra and 
Shatila (which resulted in killing as many as 4500 civilians, mainly Palestinians and Lebanese Shi’a, and 
deeply traumatised the Lebanese society). At its beginning, Hezbollah was very explicitly advocating for 
the idea of an Islamic state as a just system of rule (with the condition of the voluntary establishment of 
such system66). Hezbollah was therefore against arranging confessional “states within a state”, or 
religious cantons in Lebanon. It also vehemently opposed the sectarian shape of domestic politics, 
pointing out that the Shi’a community had been long overlooked in the political decision-making. 
 While hostility towards the government, especially during the civil war, does not come as 
surprising, the disdain of political opposition in Lebanon is not expected. After all, opposition also had a 
similar “enemy” (though probably referring to it in slightly more neutral terms) and wanted a change in 
the existing power balance in Lebanon. However, Hezbollah did not think of the oppositional 
organisations in Lebanon, which acted along the structural lines of the confessional state, as their 
“friends”; they were dubbed “defeatist” along with the Maronite establishment and the Phalange: 
 
“We consider any opposition that manoeuvers within the specified guidelines of the regime or those 
specified by the oppressive world powers to be a scare-crow opposition that in the end accomplishes  
nothing since ultimately its interests converge with the existing regime”67.  
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“Thus, we are not concerned with any call of political reform that is based on [upholding the privileges 
of] the rotten sectarian system. Likewise, we are not concerned about the formation of any cabinet or 
fielding any [Hizbullah] member to become a minister, since any governmental ministry is part and parcel 
of the oppressive, unjust regime”68 
 
Hezbollah’s opposition to the pre-Ta’if political system rendered it not only an ‘anti-system’ party 
which sought to change the very system of government, but a revolutionary one, which sought to change 
it from “outside the system”.69 The establishment of the Islamic state was supposed to be voluntary, but 
the right of self-determination and the freedom of choice are framed in religious terms70. 
 Hezbollah explained why it considers overthrowing of the existing regime one of its priorities:  
 
“Based on (our vision and prediction of the Lebanon) we confront the existing regime with the following 
two standpoints: 
1) It is the product of world arrogance and oppression and part of the political map that is an 
adversary to Islam 
2) It is an unjust regime in its very foundations, which is resistant to any change or reform. Rather 
it is incumbent upon us to completely uproot it in conformity with the Qur’anic verse (5:45) 
“Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed, those are the evildoers!””71 
 
Looking from this point of view, it is clear to see Hezbollah’s dedication to the principles of the 
Islamic rule as the only just system of governance. The opposition against the Lebanese state is 
expressed in religious, though not sectarian terms. Nowhere in the Open Letter is Hezbollah defining 
itself as “Shi’a”. It refers to Islam and its principles, however it does not discriminate against other 
branches of Islam, as long as they share goals and enemies with Hezbollah.  
It is also this contestation of the state system that caused Hezbollah to fall apart with Amal as 
another Shi’a political force in Lebanon: it claimed that the main reason of this conflict was the 
importance that Amal attained to gaining political power. As elaborated by Nasrallah, “Amal is more 
concerned with the affairs related to power and the domestic agenda than it is with the resistance 
priority”, which Hezbollah regards as a clear instance of misplaced priorities.72  
 Hezbollah was therefore against both the ruling party, as well as the opposition that (in theory) 
it should be friendly towards as they shared the common “oppressor”. This kind of radical approach was 
desirable during the war, where the concepts of the resistance and anti-systemic contestation of the 
state were motivating Hezbollah’s activities and alliances during the conflict. In addition to that, . 
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However, at the end of the conflict and with the concluding 1989 Ta’if Accords, Hezbollah had to find 
itself a new way to express its identity and to accommodate the new Lebanese political landscape.  
 
2.4 MILESTONE: THE DECISION TO GO INTO ELECTIONS 
 
 If there was one event that truly redefined the Hezbollah’s ideas and concepts about itself, it 
was the decision to take part in the first post-civil war Lebanese election in 1992. The party stood in front 
of a choice where it could either participate and be an active part of the Lebanese political life. This 
could have both pros and cons for the party, such as loss of credibility - after all, it was anti-systemic to 
begin with and called for the abolishment of the unjust sectarian system. On the other hand, though, 
through incorporation into Lebanese politics Hezbollah could be able to fulfil its primary goal – resistance 
against Israel. 
 The causal relationship at first might look as if it was the event of the elections that had inspired 
the Party of God to produce the change in its identity. This hypothesis has some solid arguments: the 
change of political landscape could have made Hezbollah realise that it had no chance of survival as an 
armed resistance in the new circumstances without achieving an operational compromise with the 
current power structure. In addition, there was also a suspicion that the party might have decided to 
“soften” its discourse due to the shifts that were happening in the Iranian leadership at the time73. These 
allegations were denied by Hassan Nasrallah, the Party Secretary General, himself, in a series of post-
election interviews in 199274. 
 The crucial argument to understand Hezbollah’s decision to participate in the earlier contested 
Lebanese sectarian system is the priority of resistance and of the Holy Jihad. Hezbollah has made it 
clear more than once that they are more invested in overthrowing the occupation of the Lebanese land 
than in overthrowing the regime (however unjust it might be)75. Even though from its previous statements 
it might look as both the resistance and the anti-statism are the fixed components of Hezbollah’s identity, 
in the face of the changing political landscape one took priority over another76. The resistance priority77 
was best explained by Hassan Nasrallah: 
 
“In reality, we were, and will always be, the party of the resistance that [operates] from Lebanon in 
reaction to occupation and daily aggression. Any party, movement or faction that abandons resistance 
under any pretext, and for any reason, is giving up on a sacred duty. Our participation in the elections 
and entry into the National Assembly do not alter the fact that we are a resistance party; we shall, in 
fact, work to turn the whole of Lebanon into a country of resistance, the state into a state of resistance. 
(…) As for the domestic situation, we feel that paying attention to it is a responsibility that we cannot 
abandon. There is a dialectical link, here, between the resistance and the internal situation in Lebanon, 
                                                          
73 After the death of Khomeini, the more moderate Imam Khamenei took over. 
74 See: Nicolas Noe (ed.), Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, London: Verso, 2007. 
75 Saad-Ghorayeb, 112-114. 
76 Ibid., 113. 
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because for the resistance to survive there should be a community that adopts it and adopts the 
resistance fighter. This means that, in order to remain steadfast, that fighter needs to secure all the 
support he needs politically, security-wise, culturally, and economically – and [he needs to ] be provided 
with the means of livelihood.” 78 
 
 With the transition of Lebanon from a conflict-torn state into the country that was entering a long-
awaited period of stabilisation it was no longer possible for Hezbollah to act on the premises it acted 
during the civil war. Therefore, Hezbollah, motivated by the wish to preserve the core elements of its 
identity construction, decided to change their representation in the public discourse and evolve in its role 
in the domestic scene.  
 The new discourse, however, was not designed to suddenly express support for the Lebanese 
state as an institution. This was explicitly made sure of by Naim Qassem, a prominent Hezbollah leader: 
 
“Participation in parliamentary elections is an expression of sharing in an existing political structure, 
Parliament being one of the regime’s pillars. It does not, however, represent a commitment to preserving 
the structure as it is, or require defence of the system’s deficiencies and blemishes”79 
 
 In addition to that, Hezbollah has made it clear that it has not given up on the idea of the Islamic 
State as such – however the achievement of this was no longer a priority for the organisation: it would 
be happy if the Lebanese people voluntarily decided that the Islamic state is they preferred way of state 
organisation: 
 
“Regarding the project of the Islamic Republic, I can assure you that we will never propose this option 
per se in Lebanon, neither through statements, slogans or speeches. We also said that this sectarian 
system is unjust and corrupt, and should therefore be replaced by another that reflects the will of the 
Lebanese people and establishes justice, security, peace and equality. (…) We are in effect saying to 
the Lebanese people that if they choose an Islamic system, we would hasten to support it. We believe, 
based on our Muslim faith, that a system that rests on Islamic principles will be able to solve all 
Lebanon’s problems, be they legislative, legal, intellectual, spiritual or moral”80 
  
In the end, it might be stated that the events in Lebanon have influenced the identity shift in 
Hezbollah, but also that Hezbollah’s identity was what motivated the change of expression and the 
reinterpretation of definitions it has been using: fulfilling its holy goal of Islamic resistance and Jihad 
pushed it towards “softening” the discourse that was applied to achieve it. Hezbollah had to prioritize on 
its goals and also on the identity pillars it wanted to make more salient at the time. 
                                                          
78 Nasrallah in an interview with Al-Watan al-Arabi, 11 September 1992, as quoted in: Nicolas Noe (ed.), Voice 
of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, London: Verso, 2007, 88-90. 
79 Naim Qassem, Hezbollah: The Story from Within, Kindle edition.  
80 Nasrallah in an interview with Al-Watan al-Arabi, 11 September 1992, as quoted in: Nicolas Noe (ed.), Voice 
of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, London: Verso, 2007, 90. 
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2.5 THE 2009 MANIFESTO: THE REINTERPRETATION OF CONCEPTS  
 
 This conceptual shift is best expressed by Hezbollah in the second identity statement issued by 
Hezbollah in 2009 - Manifesto. The difference in approach and the understanding of resistance, the self 
and the other is a result of the political and social change that both Lebanon and the Party of God had 
went through in the 30 years of Hezbollah’s activity. The following section will focus on the 
reinterpretation of the basic concepts of Hezbollah’s identity published at the end of the 2000s.  
 
2.5.1. RESISTANCE 2.0 AND THE INCORPORATION INTO LEBANESE POLITICS  
 
 In the 1982 understanding of resistance, it was a tool to achieve a total reform of the reality that 
Hezbollah was a part of at the time: eradication of its main enemy and abolishment of the existing 
oppressive political system.  
 The 2009 Manifesto follows the principles presented in the 1982 Open Letter and sticks to 
Hezbollah’s general rhetoric, yet it is a much different document than the Open Letter. First of all, it is 
more structured and dropping the character of the utopian appeal that the Open Letter had; it is a 
comprehensive political statement with the clear outline of the Party’s ideology and its postulates and 
goals. Moreover, it is a final confirmation of Hezbollah’s transformation: from a revolutionary, guerrilla 
group into one of the most prominent actors in the Lebanese political scene. 
 Resistance, of course, is still the foundation of organisation’s self-definition. Hezbollah has not 
stepped down from the harsh (to put it mildly) critique of its enemies – the United States and Israel. Two 
first sections of the Manifesto are devoted directly to describing the menace that American hegemony 
(forced upon the international arena after the fall of the Soviet Union) is to the world and to all the 
oppressed81. The victories that the Party of God took over its enemies are also listed in the Manifesto, 
with the 2006 war with Israel presented as a success on the Hezbollah’s side82. The party reaffirms its 
dedication to eradicate Israel as a state and to counter the US hegemony. The echoes of George W. 
Bush’s War on Terror can also be traced in the new Manifesto83; Hezbollah seems very much focused 
on differentiating between terrorism and resistance, describing its own activities as the latter, and 
accusing the US of the former: 
 
“In this framework, the Bush Administration decided to establish a correlation between terrorism and 
national resistance, and this in order to disarm the resistance of its humanitarian legitimacy and its 
righteousness of cause, and to justify the waging of all forms of wars against it. The last bastions of 
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defence that peoples and countries use to uphold their freedoms, dignity and pride were to be 
removed.”84 
 
“It is doubtless that US terrorism is the mother of all world terrorism. In all respects, the Bush 
Administration has transformed the US into a threat against the world at all levels”85 
  
 What is visible is that the general stance on Hezbollah’s relationship with the US and Israel has 
not changed; what is different from the 1982 is the way that Hezbollah is communicating it. There is no 
ground-breaking shift: the way in which resistance against the US and Israel is described is different 
mainly because of all the things that happened in the 24 years between the Open Letter and the 
Manifesto. The events of the 1990s and 2000s allowed Hezbollah to convey the exact same message, 
but using new arguments (see the focus on “terrorism”, a notion absent in the Open Letter) and creating 
new discourses. 
The principles on which the just state should be built are also drastically different from the Open 
Letter. There are no more mentions of the Islamic order in these requirements; Hezbollah refers to 
democratic institutions and freedoms that should be granted to Lebanese people. Moreover, it 
acknowledges the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon86, focusing on the nation and its unity 
in its manifesto. 
 Resistance is also interpreted as a nation-making tool, dedicated to the well-being of people of 
Lebanon. Even the discourse around the arch enemy, Israel, is conducted in a different way: Israel is a 
threat to the country of Lebanon and the nation of Lebanese, and because of that it should be neutralised 
(not because of a threat it poses to the Islamic revolution)87.The issue of attitude towards the Lebanese 
state and its confessional structure is the one that underwent the most significant evolution in the years 
between the Open Letter and the 2009 Manifesto. Hezbollah went from an ideological-revolutionary 
version of Islam to review its political ideology, or to even put it on the shelf and develop a secular 
political programme.88 This is clearly visible on the pages of the 2009 Manifesto. 
 First of all, Lebanon is referred to as “our homeland and that of our fathers and forefathers, just 
as it shall be the homeland to our children, our grandchildren and the generations to come”89. The 
striking difference between the Manifesto and the Open Letter is that Hezbollah identifies itself as a 
Lebanese entity; it diverged from expressing itself as a transnational group influenced the ideology of 
pan-Islamism.  
 Hezbollah in 2009 Manifesto remains consistent on its views of confessional system in Lebanon. 
It claims that sectarianism is the reason of all challenges that Lebanon faced in the past decades. 
However, it no longer repudiates all the institutions of the structure of the state – there is a dramatic shift 
in the approach towards opposition: 
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“In a true democracy, the door remains ajar for the proper alternation of power between ruling 
government supporters, on the one hand, and the opposition or various political coalitions, on the 
other”90. 
 
 Later on it is added that Hezbollah agrees with the vision of democracy and abolition of 
sectarianism outlined in the 1989 Ta’if Accords; what is more important, until the moment that these 
system is implemented, Hezbollah acknowledges the consensual democracy based on sectarian 
grounds91. This was sort of a safeguard of Hezbollah, showing that it still adheres to the ideals of 
abolishing sectarianism: nevertheless, the Ta’if accords were constructed in a way that would make 
eradication of sectarianism from Lebanese politics nearly impossible.  
 These changes have not happened without a reason. Hezbollah had to step back in its plans of 
installing the Islamic Republic in Lebanon after the events of the Iran-Iraq war92. Accepting the UN 
Resolution 598 that has ended this conflict resulted in Iran and Khomeini abandoning the project of 
establishing an Islamic Republic in Iraq; therefore, this type of regime could not had been introduced in 
Lebanon either93. The global Islamic (Shi’a) revolution did not work out, so both Iran and Hezbollah had 
to look for other ways to define themselves as both domestic and international actors. As mentioned in 
the one of previous sections, Hezbollah also had to prioritise its objectives in Lebanon and decided to 
put resistance first, since they stated that “if we want to give a people the right to choose [the political 
system it wants], it must be first free [from occupation] and only then can it choose”94. The external 
enemy must be first dealt with, and only afterwards the society can focus on the choice of Islamic (or 
another just) rule of governance.95 
 In the period between the Open Letter and the New Manifesto all of the Hezbollah goals had 
become tailored to strengthen its position in the domestic scene and gain popular support. These could 
not have been achieved with the widespread radical Islamic revolution in the Iranian type, so Hezbollah 
had to look for some other means and to figure out its new identity after the end of the Iran-Iran war and 
at the end of the Lebanese civil war. Hezbollah’s views on Lebanese state and politics are the ones that 
evolved the most in 30 years: they went from the total denial into acceptance and incorporation (even 
though still keeping up the anti-establishment mode). Hezbollah learnt that it cannot found its identity 
fully on irredentism: it needed allies in order to survive. The alliance with Iran (which had been substantial 
to Hezbollah’s existence) was not enough: friends were needed also on the domestic level. That’s why 
the organisation focused on the grass-root movements and bottom-up activism in order to gain popular 
support. The identity of Hezbollah thus shifted from revolutionary contestant of the state system into the 
fully-fledged political party, opposed to the government but willing to operate in the previously-contested 
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system. Hezbollah switched from achieving its goals through revolution to achieving its goals through 
the state structure and institutions – especially its primary goal – the resistance against Israel. 
 
3.2.3. UNITY OF MUSLIMS AND INCLUSIVINESS 
 
 As mentioned before, Hezbollah has been founded as an organisation that expressed the 
frustration and disempowerment of Lebanese Shi’a in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in its rhetoric it 
never referred explicitly to this one branch of Islam; it had more of a universal message to “all the 
oppressed” of the world, and called upon all the Muslims to unite and act against the “oppressors”.  
 However, Hezbollah’s  connection to the Shi’a Islam and identity has been strong from the very 
beginning of the organisation. The Party referred to Imam Khomeini as its faqih (the jurisprudent), and 
adopted the wilayat al-faqih as its leading religious ideology, which made its sectarian affiliation quite 
clear. Most of its leadership came from the Shi’a clergy, as well: the sectarian angle could not be 
overlooked in the establishment of the organisations. Also, the historic circumstances have been tense 
in terms of religion: in the Lebanese civil war the political divisions ran along the lines of confessional 
ones, henceforth certain political powers adapted the religious discourse in self-identification.  
 In the Open Letter of 1982, Hezbollah had very strong religious views. Its ideology was Islamic 
to the core, in the Iranian 1979 revolution spirit. The organisation defined creation of the Islamic state in 
Lebanon as one of its primary goals96 and referred to the system of Islamic government as the only just 
and fair political system. The governance based on the wilayat al-faqih was presented in opposition to 
the “oppressive” confessional system that had brought Lebanon to the civil war: 
 
“From this perspective, we do not want to impose Islam on anyone, like we do not want others to impose 
upon us their convictions and their political systems. We do not want Islam to govern Lebanon by force, 
as political Maronism is governing now. 
However, we affirm our conviction in Islam as a doctrine, political system, intellectual foundation and 
mode of governance.”97 
 
 Hezbollah in its first statement comes out as an organisation that will not discriminate against 
religious affiliations of its followers: Islam is the Open Letter can be seen as a tool to achieve a fair 
political system in Lebanon (and later on – worldwide), but what is more important, Islam has a role to 
play in the liberation of all the “oppressed” of the world, no matter what race, religion or nationality; it is 
a mean to achieve the freedom from the oppressors, America being the biggest of them. The Party of 
God addresses it explicitly in the passage on its “friends”: it presents the approach in which everyone 
who wants to take part in the revolution to overthrow the oppressive world hegemony is in the end 
following the rule of Islam, whether they are Muslim or not:  
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“Friends, wherever you are in Lebanon, and no matter which thoughts you entertain and although we 
disagree with the tactics and manner of confronting [our enemies]… we share with you our primary 
strategic goals… the necessity of breaking the chains of American hegemony in Lebanon… ridding our 
country from the despicable Israeli occupation… and frustrating all Phalangist endeavors to exercise 
hegemony over politics and administration. So let us consolidate our front and bury our differences so 
that we can achieve our common goals of making Lebanon the burial place of American and Zionist 
projects. 
You [our friends] carry ideas that do not conform to Islam… but this does not preclude cooperation with 
you in order to achieve these goals… especially since we feel that the motives which exhort you to 
struggle are Muslim motives in the first place, origination from confronting oppression and tyranny that 
have been practiced and imposed upon you… even if these motives were harboured by un-Islamic 
ideas, they have to converge back to its essence, then you witness that revolutionary Islam spearheads 
the struggle to face tyranny and oppression” 
 
The revolutionary motives against the oppressors are equalled to “Muslim motives”: the strife for social 
justice is presented as inherently Muslim; it which shows that Hezbollah is not really interested in a 
religious conversion of the growing group of its supporters: more than that, it is interested in gaining 
support for its cause, no matter the religion. It’s the motivations that matter. Not all Muslims are 
resistance fighters, but all resistance fighters (in Hezbollah’s understanding) fulfil the Muslim duty. 
 This is a very inclusive approach: it has allowed the organisation to take in people from other 
branches of Islam, or even the Christians that were not in favour of Maronite policies. However, this call 
still remains quite radical: it comes from the phase where Hezbollah was more focused on the violent 
and total overthrow of the existing world order rather than on the incorporation into local politics. 
Moreover, this approach originated from the Iranian revolutionary ideology, which was also focused on 
spreading the revolution worldwide and not on exclusion of confessional groups that did not follow the 
rule of law of Shi’a Islam. The inclusiveness and cross-cultural, cross-class and cross-religion attitude 
was strongly represented both by the Iranian spiritual leadership and by Hezbollah clerics. This has 
allowed both groups to present their ideologies as world-wide revolutions and not as local fights relevant 
only to the region. 
 It is highly probable that Hezbollah’s inclusiveness has allowed it to conduct the change in its 
personality more smoothly after the end of Lebanese civil war. After all, explaining the shift from radical 
(referred to as terrorist) organisation focused on overthrowing the unjust system to the political party 
engaging in the state structures was probably easier given Hezbollah’s concept of the “oppressed” and 
the egalitarian approach to the religious denominations of people who wanted to fight for the common 
cause of the liberation from the world oppression. 
 The inclusiveness of Hezbollah as a political organisation became more salient in the years 
following the Ta’if accords. With the decision to participate in the electoral processes in Lebanon, 
Hezbollah had to work out the way to gain supporters outside Shi’a affiliated groups. It has decided to 
shift the course of its political programme from putting the emphasis on the religious identity towards the 
emphasis on national identity. Henceforth, this policy is often called “Lebanonization” or infitah 
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(opening)98. “Nationalising” the identity and adjusting the organisations strategy to get more involved in 
the state politics resulted in even bigger inclusiveness of the party as a political actor.  
 Hezbollah’s principles remained the same at the basis: the organisation’s ideology was still to 
fight the oppression, and to establish a just system in Lebanon. Moreover, the definition of “friends” of 
Hezbollah had not changed either in any drastic way: it was cutting across religious, class and national 
boundaries. However, the main change happened in the tools engaged to achieving the goal of 
liberation: Hezbollah shifted its focus from the irredentist claims and calls to establishment of the Islamic 
order outside of Lebanese state structures, to engaging into local politics and becoming an active part 
of the state apparatus99. The post-civil war political pragmatism had been enhanced by the fact that 
Hezbollah has realised that it would be impossible to gain popular support with such strong religious 
denomination (despite the inclusiveness) and with total lack of acceptance of state structures. 
 Despite the change of discourse, Hezbollah has not completely abandoned its religious 
affiliation. It adapted to become a part of Lebanese political scene and state system and gain popular 
support outside its traditionally confessional base, but it has also worked to sustain support in the Shi’a 
community and continuously strengthen its position. Hezbollah had invested a lot of resources into the 
grass-root movements and bottom-up investments in the most underprivileged Shi’a neighbourhoods. 
In this way the Party had built an extended network of welfare and social services. These have been 
primarily, but not exclusively aimed at Shi’a communities: by doing that Hezbollah was able to 
emphasize its status as a truly Lebanese party, caring for all the citizens rather than a challenge to the 
state’s pluralist system; at the same time, it managed to maintain its ties with the community it has risen 
from.100 In addition to that, such activities allowed for the bottom-up Islamization process.  
 From this angle, the 2009 Manifesto reconfirms the policies that had be instated at the time of 
its publication: it calls both for unity of Muslims (and calls for the end of sectarian tensions between the 
Shi’a and Sunni), and reaffirms its dedication to the global goal of liberation: the approach that 
overcomes religion and class is especially visible in the passage where Hezbollah admires the Liberation 
Theology Movements from South America.101  
 To sum up, Hezbollah from its very onset had been an inclusive organisation, uniting people 
across class and religion, as long as they shared the common goal of the overthrow of the global 
oppression. From the 1985 Open Letter to 2009 Manifesto the principles remained the same: Hezbollah 
still wants to come out as an inclusive organisation that’s ideology cuts cross-class and cross-religion. 
What has changed it the goals on the domestic level and the following shift in the means towards 
achieving organisations goals. The focus on Hezbollah’s incorporation to the Lebanese political scene 
has allowed it to become even more inclusive on the domestic level and gain popular support among 
the other sects active in the country. 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Hezbollah’s identity was primarily influenced by the events that were happening in Lebanon in 
the early 1980s – the civil war and the Israeli invasion. The hostile environment in which the organisation 
had rose to power determined the way it would defined itself – in contrast to its enemies, therefore 
adapting the resistance identity, where the basic notion of Self is inseparably connected with the notion 
of the Other. Hezbollah created a resistance type identity, which majorly influenced its decision making 
as a group.  
 Henceforth, the core concept of Hezbollah identity is resistance. This has been the guiding 
principle for the group’s activity in the past over 30 years, both internally and externally. Hezbollah has 
proven itself very dedicated to the concept of resistance, which might be found as a motivation for some 
of its domestic actions. Additionally, resistance in Hezbollah’s discourse was tightly connected to the 
concept of the Islamic jihad, which was the holy duty of every Muslim. This connection has motivated 
majority of Hezbollah’s actions during the civil war, and resistance was the ultimate goal that could 
excuse the violent means to achieve it. The oppression, however, in Hezbollah’s understanding, came 
also from the within. The resistance was addressed also against the unjust sectarian system of 
government in Lebanon, which was promoting the hegemony of the Christian Maronite group.  
 From the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah appears as a radical organisation without much space 
for dialogue in Lebanese context: it was an “either with us or against us” type of political group at the 
time. It did not want to improve the system, it wanted to destroy it: everyone who thought otherwise 
became the enemy (hence the lack of agreement between Hezbollah and other opposition parties in 
Lebanon at the time). However, this particular expression of its identity formation was challenged by the 
end of the civil war and necessity to adapt to new circumstances. 
 Hezbollah’s identity formation and the change in underwent in domestic conditions proves that 
the organisation identity is in the constant flux, however Hezbollah carefully crafts its discourse about it 
in order to not appear incoherent. The organisation has managed to go from the anti-state, violently 
aggressive and unpredictable actor to the fully-fledge political party. It went from anti-state (in quite literal 
sense of the word) to anti-establishment in the matter of 10 years. The tool to connect the conflicting, or 
even competing elements of the its identity (since at first being anti-state, yet participating in the 
elections) was constant creation and recreation of the discourse Hezbollah applied to express its identity 
and the reinterpretation of its core concepts.  
Hezbollah had been using the same notions from its very beginning to define itself: resistance, 
Islam and anti-sectarianism. All the pillars of its identity are equally important, however in order to 
achieve their reinterpretation, Hezbollah was willing to make some aspects of its identity more salient 
than others. The example is the focus on resistance against Israel, and not on contestation of the 
Lebanese sectarian system before the 1992 elections.  
In addition to that, it is not only Hezbollah’s identity that was motivation for its actions; it is also 
external events that had impact on the identity shifts.  After the end of the civil war and the Ta’if accords, 
it was the change of the political circumstances that motivated the shift in the identity of the group (it 
needed to stop being so openly anti-state), but it was its identity principles (resistance) that motivated 
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Hezbollah to step back in the area of its contestation of the Lebanese governance system in order to 
keep up the resistance priority and its ability to conduct the resistance against Israel. 
 Moreover, another aspect of group’s identity – inclusiveness – facilitated Hezbollah’s shift from 
the anti-regime guerrilla group into the Lebanese political party and the consequent changes in 
organisation’s collective identity. Since Hezbollah from the very beginning was declaring willingness to 
cooperate with anyone who shared their goals – regardless the class, nationality and even religion – it 
was more reliable to act as a representative to all Lebanese people, not only the Shi’a of Lebanon. Due 
to the tactics of “nationalizing” resistance project and referring to it as a cause for all the people of 
Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to make its shift towards acceptance of the Lebanese state more 
plausible. 
 Summing up, there is an inseparable bond between Hezbollah’s identity construction and its 
decision making. It is crucial to remember that the organisation’s identity is in a constant flux, which is 
best shown by its turn from the anti-government guerrilla in to a party with its representation in the 
Lebanese parliament. This example is to be kept in mind when assessing possible future decisions of 
Hezbollah – their motivation would come from the identity it has built over the years, but in particular 
circumstances this construction would need to be reinterpreted and rebuilt. This seems to be the case 
in the decision to entry the Syrian war. 
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3. THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH, IRAN AND SYRIA 
 
 Hezbollah, as any international entity, does not exist in the vacuum. It is one of the most 
intertwined non-state actors: its relationship with its allies is particularly strong and hence has 
consequences that other alliances do not. The allies in question – Syria, Iran and Hezbollah – are often 
referred to as the “Axis of Resistance”, “Axis of Refusal”, or – with the sectarian undertone - the “Shiite 
Crescent”. For the sake of this paper, the relationship between the three will be referred to as the Axis 
of Resistance, since it is the resistance cause that ties the group together in their official discourses.  
 On the both strategic and identity level, all three actors share the common goal: the 
neutralisation of Israel. Even though Iran and Hezbollah are expressing this wish in quite radical ways 
(such of the eradication of the Zionist entity), and Syria is concerned more with the regaining of the land 
(especially the Golan Heights), the resistance against the Jewish State is ultimately something that 
keeps these actors together. Only Hezbollah’s existence is based on the existence of Israel (as 
explained in chapter 2), but the case of Israel and its occupation of the Arab land has been a vocal part 
of the both domestic and international discourse of Syria and Iran.  
 Hezbollah could not have come into being without Iranian help. The formalisation of the group 
was possible only because Iran was truly committed to the establishment of an armed group that would 
represent the new wave of Islamic renaissance in the region: Amal was too secular for the Islamic 
Republic’s liking and too focused on domestic goals. Hezbollah, who’s foundation was built upon young 
Shi’a clerics, was better equipped to represent Iranian interest outside the borders of the Islamic 
Republic. Iran could also support Hezbollah as its own foreign policy “project” of spreading the great 
Islamic Revolution further in the region. The Party of God, also by geographic proximity, had potential 
to represent another of Iran’s crucial interest in its agenda – the annihilation of the state of Israel. Hence 
the anti-Israeli stand of Hezbollah in early stages complied fully with Iran’s foreign policy towards the 
Jewish state at the time. Thus, it was also in the interest of the Islamic Republic to provide both 
ideological support and the supplies needed for Hezbollah to function. 
 The alliance between Syria and Hezbollah seems more of a marriage of convenience: objectives 
and goals of both actors not always had been compliant. Syria had already been present in Lebanon at 
the time of emergence of Hezbollah as an organisation: the cooperation between the two was facilitated 
majorly by the Party of God’s sponsor, Iran. Syria saw in Hezbollah its chance to delegate the logistical 
effort to fight Israel in the South of Lebanon (which Syria saw as the part of the Greater Syria, Bilad al-
Sham)102 and perceived supporting Hezbollah as forwarding its own foreign policy goals against the 
Jewish State. Throughout the years, together with Hezbollah’s growing engagement in Lebanese 
politics, the objectives of both actors have become more and more contradictory. Even though Hezbollah 
has become more Lebanon-oriented, it was also aware that it needed Syria to sustain the relationship 
with Iran. Therefore, the history of relations between Hezbollah and Syria is far more complex and is 
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based on a power-struggle and negotiations about the zones and degree of influence of each actor on 
Lebanese politics.  
 The following paragraphs will look at the relationship between all three actors, with the particular 
focus on the Iran-Hezbollah and Syria-Hezbollah angle. Firstly, it will look on how Iran has influenced 
ideological stance of Hezbollah and what possible impact on the decision-making it might have had with 
providing the Party of God with resources; following that, the chapter will try to recap and assess the 
relationship between Syria and Party of God in the last 30 years, and try to determine whether their 
common history and influence on identity construction had been behind Hezbollah’s decision to go into 
the Syrian civil war.  
 
3.1 IRAN’S ROLE IN HEZBOLLAH’S IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION 
 
 The establishment of Hezbollah would not had been possible but for the 1979 Iranian revolution 
and the ideological shift it had brought to the region. It was on this particular wave of new Shi’a 
leadership that Hezbollah was able to rise to power as a political organisation. The angle from which the 
connection between Iran and Hezbollah will be analysed in this part is more ideological then political, as 
it was the Iranian revolution’s ideology that had the biggest influence on the shape of Hezbollah’s identity 
construction (especially in the early stages). What is worth mentioning, this part focuses only on 
Hezbollah’s identity formation in relation to Iran – not on the actual political relationship between two 
actors. The connections between them will be attended to in the following chapters of this paper. 
The general Shi’a political mobilisation in the late 1970s-early 1980s in Lebanon was greatly 
inspired by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and was partly built on hope of backing and 
reinforcement of the Islamic state in Iran103. In order to understand this connection, a closer look at the 
ideological relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is necessary.  
First of all, Hezbollah from the very beginning acknowledged the religious leadership from Iran: 
the cornerstone of this relationship was a shared belief in wilayat al-fakih - the guardianship of the 
jurisprudent104: 
 
“In the 1980s, Hizbullah regarded wilayat al-faqih, as defined by Khumayni, as its true Islamic cultural 
identity and adopted it, in its original formulation, under the motto of: “The Islamic Revolution in 
Lebanon”. Hezbollah recognized Khumayni as the official marja’ al-taqlid (religious-legal authority of 
emulations) of the Islamic republic and as the first faqih (jurisprudent, jurisconsult) (…) to assume the 
title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi and to establish an Islamic state”105. 
 
 This acknowledgement of the wilayat al-faqih was resonating strongly with the early Hezbollah’s 
postulates of establishment of the Islamic state (and abolition of the nation-state that Lebanon is). In the 
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Open Letter, Hezbollah claims that Khomeini “detonated the Muslims’ revolution” and was “bringing 
about the glorious Islamic renaissance”106.  
Moreover, Hezbollah quite quickly adapted the revolutionary rhetoric and the semantics of 
struggle and resistance: 
 
“[Hezbollah] resolutely situated itself within the dual Khomeinist perspective of revolutionary struggle 
and the fight against Israel. It embraced marginality, rejecting any compromise with the established 
Lebanese system. Its top priority was jihad against the occupier (…)”107 
 
All the themes that Hezbollah has undertaken in its Open Letter (as mentioned before) resonate strongly 
with the statements that Iran was making at the time. In addition, following the spiritual leadership of 
Khomeini had yet another advantage – the Imam quite quickly defined his stance on Israel as an entity 
with giving Yasser Arafat keys to the Israeli embassy in Teheran and defining his primary goal as to 
destroy Israel 108. It was very handy for Hezbollah to take his spiritual mentorship and to follow this goal 
in the face of the 1982 invasion. Common goal and common enemy facilitated the cooperation between 
the actors.  
  The goal of establishing a greater Islamic state after the 1979 Iranian revolution was as well 
ideological as political. Henceforth, Hezbollah had become a tool for expression of Iranian revolutionary 
ideas as well as it had been a proof to the inevitable spread of the new politico-ideological order onto 
the Muslim world. Hezbollah was fully aware that it needed Iranian backing (both on ideological and 
political grounds) to survive, which might have had influence on another aspect of its identity: 
inclusiveness. The organisation followed the path of pan-Islamism, not Islamism as such: it refuted the 
idea of acting as the religious force and instating the religious order within the nation-state. Hezbollah, 
together with Iran, in its early stages postulated establishment of a bigger entity uniting all the Muslims 
under the rule of religious law, which would override both the borders and the laws ruling the nation-
state.109 The official documents from this time refrain from referring to Lebanon or Iran as sovereign 
states, as this would involve denying their status as provinces of a greater Islamic entity110. In addition, 
the achievement of this entity would be voluntary to all the people that would like to be a part of it. 
 In the aspect of creating the pan-Islamic state, Hezbollah has changed its views after the end 
of the Lebanese civil war111. As mentioned before, the organisation shifted its identity to be able to 
operate within the given nation-state frames, and not to act towards abolishing them. It was a necessary 
step to continue to conduct the resistance project, therefore it is possible to say it was easier accepted 
by the Iranian leadership. Despite the adaptation into domestic politics, Hezbollah could not repudiate 
the wilayat al-faqih principle – it just needed to readjust it to the new political circumstances. In order to 
achieve that, it still sought the “legitimacy” from the faqih to make the decision about participating in the 
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national elections in 1991112. Since it has been granted, Hezbollah had no problem from the ideological 
standpoint to become a part of the structure they so vehemently opposed – it was justified in the terms 
of greater good for the people and that possible benefits for the resistance outweighed the loss for the 
idea of the pan-Islamic state.113 The interpretation of wilayat all-faqih evolved parallel to the growing 
engagement of Hezbollah into domestic Lebanese politics – the culmination point of this being the 
decision to participate in the Lebanese cabinet after the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, legitimacy for which 
was secured from Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi – the head of the Association of Shiite Religious Scholars of 
Jabal ‘Amil in south Lebanon – and not Khamenei114. It was justified with the interpretation of the wilayat 
al-faqih principle taking into consideration that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have to be perceived 
as the jurisconsult of all the Muslims, and as a result not all Islamic movements have to abide by the 
orders and directives of faqih or the regime.115 This proves the previously mentioned argument of 
Hezbollah focusing more on the domestic activities and harbouring more “Lebanese” identity, while 
turning away from its radically Islamist and pan-Islamic views.  
 To sum up, there are two salient aspects of Hezbollah’s identity construction that are connected 
to the 1979 Iranian revolution: first of all, adopting the wilayat al-faqih principle as the guarding principle 
of the organisation and secondly, the commitment to establishment of the pan-Islamic state. This, 
together with the strong focus on the resistance against the imperialistic United States, formed the solid 
basis for the ideological alliance between the two actors. Hezbollah is called the “brainchild” of the post-
revolutionary Iran for a reason: but for this event, its establishment and identity construction in the way 
we know it today would not had been possible. Even though Iranian revolution provided the solid 
foundation for the organisation’s identity and principles, Hezbollah proved that also that could be subject 
of contestation and evolution throughout the years. This development reflects the general direction in 
which the Party of God’s identity construction had been going in the last three decades – from the 
radical, anti-state and pan-Islamist organisation towards the mature political party, focused on domestic 
issues and realising its programme through participation in the state structures.  
 
3.2 STRATEGIC-IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN 
 
 Without incentives and support from Iran, there would be no Hezbollah. It is not to say that 
Hezbollah is fully Iran-dependent and would have not come to being without the Islamic Republic; rather 
than that, it was Iran who was able to capitalize and put into action the Lebanese Shi’a’s political 
frustration and turn it into an institutionalized movement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, close 
ties between the two actors are also a part of Hezbollah’s identity construction – explicitly stated in the 
documents that represent the organisation’s self-perception.  
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Iranian support for Hezbollah goes on two parallel levels: ideological and logistical. Both are 
intertwined, however it is possible to distinguish between the type of influence each of them has on 
Hezbollah’s decision making. The logistics are more connected to the foreign policy agenda of Iran and 
the geopolitical situation of the region as such; ideological level serves the purpose of gathering support 
and identity legitimisation both locally and regionally.  
Iranian revolution gave the Shi’a movement in Lebanon space for expressing their long-overdue 
frustration about their own disenfranchisement. In practical, material terms Iran provided necessary 
resources and supplies for launching the group’s activities: it was the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, 
Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, who reputedly directed majority of efforts in founding Hezbollah. The Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) had set up camps in the Beka’a Valley and provided military training, arms 
and leadership for the resistance movement against the Israeli in the south of Lebanon. On top of that, 
Iran has continued to provide financial subsidies ever since. In return, Hezbollah has acknowledged the 
Iranian leadership (however on a more spiritual than direct level – see later in this chapter) – moreover, 
its leaders have been regularly received in Teheran116 from the onset of the organisation to this day. 
The Hezbollah project was not some undercover operation that Iran has conducted secretively to help 
its foreign policy goals: it was a public, state-sponsored partnership, which from the beginning was 
supposed to serve (or at least help in a significant way) a particular agenda of the Iranian Revolution. 
The support was explicitly legitimised in state documents: the new Iranian constitution (adopted in 1979) 
mandated the revolutionary regime’s involvement with the Lebanese Shi’a. Article 3 asserts that the 
government is duty-bound to provide “unsparing support to the dispossessed of the world” and Article 
154 says that the government “supports the just struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors in 
every corner of the globe”117. Henceforth, the phrasing of the document in this way might have inspired 
Hezbollah to adopt the dichotomy of the “oppressors” and the “oppressed” in its identity construction: in 
this way, Iranian interference was justified and made “legal” both for the domestic and foreign audiences. 
 However, the close cooperation between Iran and Hezbollah would not be possible without the 
external event of Israeli invasion of 1982. At the invasion’s onset, Iran was hoping to make Amal, the 
first Lebanese Shi’a movement, cooperate in forwarding Iranian goal of eradicating the state of Israel, 
or at least removing it from the south of Lebanon. As it later turned out, Amal was more interested in 
pursuing local goals and getting involved in the ongoing Lebanese civil war; moreover, they were 
inclined towards alliances with Maronite Christians, the fact which Iran was not willing to agree on. 
Hence, the Islamic Republic would have had little chance of mobilizing a significant pro-Iranian political 
movement capable of competing with the Lebanon-centric Amal without the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
(in this case, the Tehran-Damascus relationship also facilitated this process as Syria was not interested 
in alliances with the Maronites either)118. The Israeli interference in Lebanon created a new space in the 
Shi’a public sphere - a space for Iran to neutralize the anti-Palestinian bias institutionalized in Amal and 
shift a part of the Shi’a from their previous preoccupation with their rights inside the Lebanese system 
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to countering the external enemies of Islam119. Separation of this political potential from the Amal-
dominated Shi’a environment resulted in establishing the new political movement, Hezbollah: 
 
“Military activities were just one aspect of Iranian involvement in Lebanon, but early efforts to advance 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s religio-political views through contacts with Amal had not borne fruit. Meanwhile, 
splits among Lebanese Shi’a had emerged, after the political leadership of Amal, represented by Nabih 
Berri, and the more religious members of the organization – some of whom would go on to leadership 
positions in Hizbullah – disagreed on how to fight Israel and on the necessity of alliances with Maronite 
Christians. Some of the Iranian personnel who remained in Lebanon after the main IRGC contingent 
departed helped create the committee that would serve as Hizbullah’s first decision-making council (this 
would eventually become the Majlis al-Shura). The committee’s final document, the so-called Manifesto 
of the Nine, was submitted to (…) Khomeini. [he] approved the document, thereby enshrining the 
theocratic concept of Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult (wilayat el-fakih) for the Lebanese 
Shi’a”. 120 
 
 This also shows how the foreign policy goals and spiritual leadership were intertwined from the 
very beginning of the alliance between Hezbollah and Iran. Hezbollah’s cooperation with Iran had a 
better potential of mobilizing the frustrated Shi’a minority, as Iran claimed to champion the “deprived 
masses” and this corresponded to the Lebanese Shi’a’s perception of their historical experience, while 
Iran’s revolution was a model of how such people could overpower a militarily powerful oppressor.121 
Another important symbolic that was used to mobilize the Lebanese Shi’a within the discourse of the 
oppressors and the oppressed was the Karbala Paradigm. During the Iranian revolution of the 1979, the 
oppressed Iranian masses came to represent Hussein and those who died with him during the battle of 
Karbala, while the Shah and his regime were associated with the Umayyad rulers. Imam was also 
emphasised as a model for rebellion also against foreign imperial powers. In the Lebanese case, we 
could see a shift in the Karbala paradigm from resisting the oppressor, to resisting the invader Israel, as 
Karbala narrative has proved to be a flexible set of symbols, ready to evolve in accordance with changing 
political trends. (…) Hence Hezbollah created a conceptual shift through its interpretation of the Karbala 
Paradigm and changed its understanding: With Hezbollah the Karbala paradigm becomes resistance 
against the oppressor/occupier rather than a revolt against a ruler. In this case, the foreign occupying 
state is Israel and its ally, the USA.122 This example also shows the extensive influence that the Islamic 
Republic had on the pillars of the identity construction of Hezbollah.  
 
There is a particular causal relationship between what kind of support a non-state organisation 
can get from a state and how they make decisions influenced by it: 
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“… state support has a powerful, yet indirect effect on violent non-state actor decision-making by 
shaping the options available to groups’ leaders. (…) they empower such organisations to undertake 
long-range planning and adopt a long-term perspective towards their struggle. (…) sponsored violent 
non-state actors can also leverage the financial resources provided by sponsors to pursue ‘hearts and 
minds’ campaigns predicated on their ability to provide social services and welfare benefits”. (….) 
through the resources they provide, state sponsors fundamentally shape both the environment within 
which terrorist and insurgent leaders make decisions and the options available to them”123  
  
 From the onset of Hezbollah, Iranian impact is reflected not only in the openly-stated religious 
leadership affiliation and shared identity features: it showed itself in the very core of Hezbollah’s 
structure. This closeness manifested itself in the Iranian officials’ participation in the key decision-making 
bodies of Hezbollah. The 17-member Majlis al-Shura, which was created by Iran’s ayatollah Fazlollah 
Mahallati – a top figure in IRGC contingent – and which did not hold regular meetings until May 1986, 
included “one or two” IRGC representatives or officials from the Iranian embassies in Beirut or 
Damascus. The Majlis al-Shura continues to include at least one IRGC official124. Therefore, Iran had 
some influence on how the organisation is governed, but also on how the identity of the Party of God is 
structured. The premise of the organisation’s activity (at least in the early years) – terrorism and 
martyrdom – was also legitimised by Khomeini’s endorsement of the movement125. 
 Again, politics, identity and religion come intertwined; it is not only the decision-making bodies 
of Hezbollah that were influenced by Iran – the clerical leadership mirrored that of the Islamic Republic 
itself. The education of most of its leaders in Najaf or Qom gave the movement powerful trans-state 
connections.126 Hezbollah’s charter states that matters of debate which cannot be decided by the 
organisation’s governing council should be referred to the decision of the Supreme Leader.127 
In terms of material support, the primary resource that can be provided by the state to the non-
state organisation is money. Due to the specifics of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah the 
numbers are hard to trace. Even though there are no accurate accounts on the size of Iranian funding, 
reportedly the material assistance provided by the Islamic Republic was annually valued at 
approximately $140 million during the 1980s, and subsequently declined to between $50 and $100 per 
annum in the later stages. Besides financial resources, Iran also offered Hezbollah’s cadres a safe 
haven on its own territory and negotiated with Syria to procure it a sanctuary closer to home, in 
Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley.128 Hezbollah has acknowledged receiving millions of dollars of financial 
support annually from Iran; while much of this funding has not come from government sources, it has 
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been derived from foundations and charitable organisations that are directly controlled by the Supreme 
Leader. 129 
 The logistical support of Iran to Hezbollah has been extensive and stable throughout the years. 
The factor that facilitated it was also Iran’s relationship with Assad’s Syria – who provided the territory 
for running all necessary operations in transferring resources. That was not an easily earned help, as 
Iran only convinced Assad to permit Iranian aid to transit its territory by promising to annually provide 
Syria with nine million tons of free oil. Only later Hezbollah’s efficiency at combating Israel gradually 
convinced Syrian leaders that it could play a key role in Syria’s regional strategy.130  
 
 The two levels of this relationship bring mutual profits to both actors: material support is a 
survival factor for Hezbollah without a doubt; the religious affiliation had been helping to spread the 
ideals of the Iranian revolution (up to some point, as the 1979 events did not cause a wave of revolutions 
in the region in the end). Hezbollah needs Iran, but Iran also needs Hezbollah: this relation is reciprocal, 
even though the power imbalance has been evened out in the recent years with the growing domestic 
independence of Hezbollah. 
 It has been documented that when Hezbollah got more engaged in the local politics, it had 
become gradually more independent from Iran in its decision-making processes, and also this 
independence has spread to the spiritual level – when Hezbollah searched for the endorsement of its 
politics from the Lebanese cleric, and not the Supreme Leader in Iran131 . Iranian support, however, 
remains undisputable. However, it is important to point out that:  
 
“(…) State sponsorship can contribute markedly to non-state actors’ capabilities. However, the ability to 
use the resources sponsors provide depends heavily on such characteristics internal to the non-state 
groups themselves as their decision-making processes and members’ backgrounds. In Hezbollah’s 
case, although Iran’s provisions (…) enabled Hezbollah to equip large insurgent forces, the 
organization’s operational successes were a product of tactics devised and implemented by its 
Lebanese cadres, who drew more heavily on their prior experience in Lebanon’s Civil War than on the 
inexpert advice offered by Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps. Consequently, Iranian support 
strengthened Hezbollah only insofar as the organization creatively adapted its inputs to Lebanon’s 
unique environment.”132 
   
 In the end, it was not the fact that Iran supported Hezbollah that allowed the organisation to 
achieve success in its operations – it was the way in which the provided resources were used that 
enabled Hezbollah to grow to its current dimensions and position.133  
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 Iranian sponsorship had a powerful, yet indirect effect in shaping both Hezbollah’s decision-
making processes and the strategic options that its Shura could choose between.134. Nevertheless, over 
the years, there have been examples of the direct influence of Iran on Hezbollah’s actions. Hezbollah 
as an organisation based in southern Lebanon and an actor that emerged in the middle of Israeli invasion 
during Lebanese civil war, was more willing to engage in activities targeted towards these two issues: 
combating Israel and solving the civil war crisis135. Organisation’s list of enemies had been extended by 
the leverage that Iran held over Hezbollah and it was at times Iran’s foreign policy goals that were 
motivating the behaviour of the Party of God. 
Iranian leaders periodically attempted to use Hezbollah as a proxy to attack its enemies and 
therefore coaxed the organization to enlarge its target list to include objectives it would otherwise have 
never considered136. Alternatively, when Iran was worried that Hezbollah’s activities could be harmful 
for the Islamic Republic foreign policies, it used its leverage against Hezbollah in order to restrain the 
organisation137.  
 
Hezbollah grew to fame as a terrorist organisation, however its first major act of terror – the October 
1983 attach on the American and French contingents in the MNF (Multinational Force) – was inspired 
directly by Iranian leadership: 
 
“ (… ) Iran’s ambassador in Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, initiated preparations for the attach by 
contacting the Iranian IRGC commander in the Beka’a Valley to request that Hezbollah attach the MNF. 
The IRGC commander, Ahman Kan’ani, convened a meeting with key Hezbollah decision-makers, 
including future general secretaries Abbas al-Musawi and Hassan Nasrallah. The fact that the impetus 
for the attack came from Iran’s Damascus Embassy suggests that Syria may have requested Iranian 
aid in countering MNF activities it considered prejudicial to its interests in Lebanon”138. 
 
 The suicide attack that Hezbollah conducted on Iranian orders resulted in 300 military personnel 
deaths and precipitated the MNF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, easing the way for Syria’s eventual return 
to Beirut139.  
 Another example is the 1982-1991 Lebanese hostage crisis; it is believed to be inspired by the 
Islamic Republic since the event that triggered the kidnapping of foreigners was the disappearance of 
four Iranian personnel travelling in a Christian-controlled region in Northern Lebanon. In order to 
encourage the United States to cooperate in finding the missing diplomats, Iranian agents kidnapped 
David Dodge, president of the American University of Beirut, and smuggled him into Iran via Syria. The 
direct involvement of Iran backfired since USA quickly located Dodge and managed to convince Syria 
to pressurize Iran to release him. In the face of this failure, Iran decision-makers chose to use local proxy 
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for pursuing its strategy140. Henceforth, Hezbollah (despite its leaders’ opinion that kidnapping 
Europeans might cause the organisation more trouble than profit) got engaged in the abductions of 
foreigners conducted between 1982 and 1991. Even though Hezbollah denied organisation’s direct role 
in these events, there is evidence that suggests participation of at least two prominent Hezbollah military 
commanders – Imad Mughniyah and Husayn al-Musawi in these kidnappings.141 It is clear from the 
abovementioned examples that Hezbollah’s decision-making in the 1980s at times was heavily 
dependent on Iran and the Islamic Republic’s objectives in the region. These actions could be presented 
in the frame of the resistance priority, however the resistance against the USA was never as vocal in 
Hezbollah’s discourse as it was in the Iranian one. 
 With the “Lebanonisation” of Hezbollah, the examples of direct Iran intervention grew scarce – 
for a few reasons. Firstly, Hezbollah (although with Iranian consent to do so) decided to step into local 
politics and participate in the elections. Moreover, Syria grew to be the bigger concern in Lebanon as it 
was physically present in the country up until 2005 and actively meddling in the domestic political scene 
there. Finally, Hezbollah, as a more active domestic actor, over the years had become gradually more 
independent from Iran. Thus, in the most recent years, ideological and logistical linkages are still evident, 
but direct operational linkages between Hezbollah and Iran have been more difficult to pinpoint. It is 
difficult to estimate the exact extent of the influence Iran has had over the decision-making process in 
Hezbollah, or whether Hezbollah would have been able to maintain itself in the absence of Iranian 
support.142 
 
3.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA: THE MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE 
 
3.3.1 SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON  
 
 The link between Hezbollah and Iran seems quite straightforward: one actor stood behind the 
creation of the other, with the strong ideological ties that have survived its ups and downs. The 
relationship between Syria and Hezbollah, however, is more complex and the power dynamics are 
different than in case of the Islamic Republic. To understand the relationship between Syrian 
government and Hezbollah better, it is needed to mention the context of Syrian presence in Lebanon 
between 1976-2005.  
 Syria was already involved in the Lebanese civil war at the time of establishment of Hezbollah. 
Syria’s 1976 intervention in Lebanon was most immediately motivated by the grave security threat from 
the prospect that civil war and partition of Lebanon would open the door to Israeli penetration; however, 
the conflict also presented an opportunity for Damascus to insert itself as arbiter and draw Lebanon 
under its politico-military wing.143 As Syrian presence on the ground lasted 30 years, this endeavour can 
be seen as successful. 
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 Assad became a part of multiple factions fighting each other in the civil war. When, after 15 
years, the war ended, he needed some legitimisation for its presence on the ground other than “a 
peacekeeping mission”. This presence received formal status in May 1991, with the signing of the 
“Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon”, which state that 
the policies of both countries would be fully coordinated on any issue, whether internal, pan-Arab or 
international, and which also allowed Syrian army to stay in Beirut and in other areas in Lebanon, in 
spite of the clause in the Ta’if Agreement calling for the Syrian army’s departure.144 Thus, with this treaty, 
Lebanon regained the much-needed stability after exhausting civil war, but lost its independence, de 
facto turning into a sort of Syrian protectorate. This state of matters received consent of the Arab world, 
Israel and the United States – it was nicknamed “the Syrian peace”, and analogy to the ‘Roman Peace” 
which meant forced peace between hitherto fighting actors due to the control of the Roman Empire in 
the lands in annexed.145  
Accomplishing this feat required gently dealing with Lebanon’s democratic political system, 
which held periodic elections. As Assad could not prevent the renewal of these elections after the civil 
war, he could not allow these elections to be completely free either since he had to make sure they 
would produce the desired results. Electoral intervention was therefore chosen as the optimal method.146 
Syria had influence over the electoral system, composition of the candidates list and sometimes 
intervened in a more drastic way. There were a few examples of Syrian “intervention” in the electoral 
results, such as an unsolved murder of the not-Syria-preferred president Rene Moawad (widely believed 
to be inspired by Assad), and on the contrary – prolonging the term of the pro-Syrian Elias Harawi 
(against the Lebanese constitution). Syria was also making all the effort to install politicians and officials 
friendly towards Assad in most of the public institutions.147 The real power of Assad was also 
consolidated by the fact that Syria had become the biggest armed force in the Lebanese territory; its job 
was to disarm the militias and to provide security while the national army was being reconstructed.148 It 
was also a power move on the Syrian side to allow only Hezbollah to maintain its arms after the Ta’if 
accords: Syria needed them as they could be used against the Party of God’s and Assad’s common 
enemy – Israel. 
This dominance lasted until 2005; it was in 2000, after the withdrawal of the IDF forces, when 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon became less and less justifiable. Moreover, the 2005 assassination of 
the very domestically popular prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, which was probably inspired by Syria, 
exhausted Lebanese patience with Assad. This was the event that finally made Syria withdraw from 
Lebanon, even though the influences remained strong – due to ties to Hezbollah. 
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3.3.2 SYRIA-HEZBOLLAH RELATIONSHIP 
 
 Syrian presence in Lebanon is one thing that most certainly had influence on Hezbollah, 
however the Hezbollah-Syria axis was not always overlapping with Syrian-Lebanese relations and 
interests.  
While Iran was interested in Hezbollah as both its armed wing outside the Islamic Republic for 
fighting Israel and also as a propaganda tool for spreading the Islamic revolution, Syria at first did not 
see that much profit in collaborating with the Party of God. Assad had no interest in spreading the new 
Shi’a religious revolution: he was interested in beating Israel and control over civil war-torn Lebanon 
was crucial to achieving this goal. Henceforth, when the tensions between the Lebanese Shi’a rose in 
the 1980s, Syrian regime tried to play them against each other in order to pursue its own agenda149. 
Conflicted local actors could serve as a justification to the prolonged presence and the “peacekeeping 
mission” under the pretext of which Syria entered Lebanon in 1976.150 
While Iran patronized Hezbollah, Syria, seeing it as both a threat and an opportunity, had a 
much more ambivalent and sometimes quite hostile relation with it. Some sources claim that Syria 
invented its differences with Hezbollah to get Western approval for its pacification of Lebanon. It would 
be more accurate to say that Syria so exploited the very real differences it had with Hezbollah for the 
exact same purpose.151 
 Syrian ambitions in Lebanon, briefly touched upon in the previous paragraph, at first could have 
been seen compatible with Hezbollah and its identity construction in the formative years. Hezbollah 
could serve Syria’s interest of defending Lebanon’s southern border and defeating Israel (without 
potential losses on Syrian side). At first, Hezbollah did not seem interested in building up the “Lebanese” 
side to its activities; henceforth, it should have not had much against Syrian control over the country. 
However, even during the war (with the seemingly compatible objectives), Syria and Hezbollah grew 
some significant differences. Secular, pan-Arab Syria increasingly came to see resurgent Islamic 
militancy as another major obstacle to its drive for hegemony in Lebanon. This put further strain on the 
Syrian-Iranian alliance152. It was due to Hezbollah’s obedience to Iran, which (under the rule of 
Khomeini) was still primarily focused on spreading the Islamic revolution to the Middle East and beyond. 
Because of that, Hezbollah had developed a long-standing, albeit ambivalent relation with Syria. In the 
early 1980s, right after the Israeli invasion, it rendered Syria immense services in the struggle against 
the Israeli occupation, Western multinational forces and the Gemayel government. However, when Syria 
managed to join forces with Amal against Israel, Assad had less need of Hezbollah and tried to reign it 
in as early as 1984. Syria believed Hezbollah’s Islamic vision to be incompatible with the pluralistic 
secular Lebanon it sought to reconstruct. Hezbollah was fiercely independent of Damascus but Syria 
needed control over it in order to calibrate the pressure of Shiite resistance against Israel in the south.153 
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 The relationship between Syria and Hezbollah could not have existed without the main driving 
force behind early Hezbollah’s operations – Iran. The agreement for cooperation needed to be three-
partite to have any operational value. Assad and the Iranian leadership agreed to a strategic framework 
to govern their relationship with the group: Tehran would organize Hezbollah, subsidize it, and provide 
it with weaponry. Damascus would oversee Hezbollah operations against Israeli troops to ensure that 
Hezbollah operations did not expose the Syrian army to military confrontation with Israel and would 
allocate the Beka’a Valley as a location for the IRGC to establish training camps. Moreover, Syrian 
authorities would secure the supply route and assist with logistics.154 
Theoretically, it should have been a well-functioning organism. The realities – especially in the 
circumstances of the prolonged civil war tearing up Lebanon – turned out to be different. After initial 
Syrian tolerance of Hezbollah and its activities in Lebanon, Syria grew to see it as a problem. The 
differences between Hezbollah and Syria in this period preliminary rose from the incompatible foreign 
policy objectives of Iran and Syria. The main problem was Hezbollah’s actions that were motivated by 
Iranian foreign policy (such as foreigners’ kidnappings in the 1980s) were often against Assad’s political 
objectives – for example after the kidnapping of Dodge he threatened to expel IRGC from Lebanon. It 
is true that Assad’s support for Hezbollah was not unconditional. He expected to maintain a tight grip 
over the group155. In addition to that, he expected Iran to be less unpredictable in the actions it used 
Hezbollah for – Assad believed that he had leverage in this situation as without his support the survival 
of Hezbollah would not have been so obvious. During the course of the civil war, Hezbollah rose to 
significant power: Assad learnt to see it not only as a resistance movement, but also as a strong political 
force in Lebanon.156 
Hezbollah would, until the 1990s, prove more an obstacle than an aid to Syrian ambitions in 
Lebanon157. To this point, coincidence of two events helped to shift Syrian-Hezbollah relations at the 
beginning of the 1990s: the end of the civil war and Hezbollah’s decision to go into Lebanese politics 
together with the 1989 death of Imam Khomeini the rise of the pragmatist Rafsanjani. As Syria’s 
dominance in Lebanon was consolidated, mainstream Hezbollah leaders, encouraged by Rafsanjani, 
realized they had to adapt to Syria’s power and struck a working alliance with Damascus: in return for 
Syria’s support for its unique role at the head of the Islamic resistance in the south, Hezbollah would 
tailor its activities to serve Syrian strategy in the conflict with Israel.158 With Hezbollah’s entrance to 
Lebanese politics, the alliance became necessary to fight against common enemies in the Lebanese 
political arena.159 
                                                          
154 Robert G. Rabil, „Has Hezbollah’s Rise Come at Syria’s Expense?”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 14 Issue 4, (Fall 
2007), accessed online on: https://www.meforum.org/articles/2007/has-hezbollah-s-rise-come-at-syria-s-
expense (access date: 22nd April 2018) 
155 Rabil, accessed online on: https://www.meforum.org/articles/2007/has-hezbollah-s-rise-come-at-syria-s-
expense (access date 22nd April 2018) 
156 Rabil, accessed online on: https://www.meforum.org/articles/2007/has-hezbollah-s-rise-come-at-syria-s-
expense (access date 24th April 2018) 
157 Ehteshami, Hinnebusch, 129. 
158 Ibid., 137. 
159 Ibid., 137-138. 
  Aleksandra Kalowska, Leiden University 2018 
  student number: 1602349 
 
42 
 
 Syria was eager to cooperate with Hezbollah as long as it did not exhibit ambitions to become 
too independent. There were a couple methods that Syrian regime used in order to curb Hezbollah’s 
growing domestic ambitions: for starters, it was deft exploitation of Amal-Hezbollah rivalries that gave 
Syria control over both movements.160 Then, the regime had been continuously  “convincing” Hezbollah 
to prepare a joint candidate list in Amal, which would prevent either of the actors from obtaining 
substantial power in the Lebanese political system.161 This rule applied also to other political parties, not 
directly tied to Assad’s regime: all Lebanese politicians aspiring to top governmental positions quickly 
understood that no one would be able to secure one of five most important posts (president, prime 
minister, speaker of the house, minister of defence and minister of the interior) without total commitment 
to all aspects of the “joint Lebanese-Syrian foreign policy” that was being orchestrated at the time of the 
early 1990s.162 
 There might be a connection between the power that secular Syria held over Lebanon from in 
the 1990s and the “Lebanonisation” and de-radicalisation of Hezbollah. Even though there is lack of 
proof and the shift in Hezbollah’s identity is more likely to be the effect of many internal and external 
circumstances, it is safe to say that the Party of God would not be able to achieve major political success 
in Lebanon if it had stuck to its radical Islamist policies that were a core of its identity at the beginning.163 
The Party of God did not abandon its priorities completely in face of Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon; 
nevertheless, Hezbollah leaders understood the need to compromise party’s ideology to adjust to 
Lebanon’s changing circumstances. The Islamization of Lebanon still remained a central point of Party’s 
agenda, but it became more of a long-term objective164. Hezbollah, however, was not a powerless actor 
in face of Syrian domination in the region. The relationship was mutual: while Syria was using Hezbollah 
to engage in direct fights with Israel without having to take any casualties within the Syrian army, 
Hezbollah also had won a powerful ally in its refusal of disarmament. When all the militias were due to 
disarm after the Ta’if Accords, Hezbollah – excusing itself with the need to conduct “resistance” in the 
South of Lebanon – was still able to keep up its combat activities. 
 All the meddling that Assad had employed in order to curb Hezbollah, was accepted by the party 
without bigger opposition. There is a pragmatic explanation to that, as seen above (the power balance), 
however there is also an explanation in the Hezbollah’s identity construction. The rationale behind the 
Party’s decision to acquiesce to Syria’s demands was that its resistance priority would have been 
seriously jeopardised had it disregarded Syria’s wishes.165 Syria could have directly obstructed 
resistance activities in the South if Hezbollah did not comply with its objectives in Lebanon; moreover, 
were the situation with Amal to become hostile (if Hezbollah opposed explicitly the Syrian meddling 
between the two parties), the Party of God could have been drawn into another civil war in the south 
and that could divert its attention from the resistance priority. 
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Hizbullah sacrificed its political independence and integrity, and perhaps even its political size, 
for the sake of preserving its resistance to the Israeli occupation. Thus, there is much truth in Nasrallah’s 
claim that, rather than subordinate its resistance to its political activity, Hezbollah’s political activity 
serves its resistance.166 
 The breakthrough year for the Syria-Hezbollah relationship was definitely year 2000, when two 
major events have happened: first, Israel withdrew from the “security zone” it had been occupying since 
the civil war in South Lebanon, and in Syria, Hafez Assad died and his son, Bashar, became his 
successor.  
After death of Hafez Assad, his son Bashar (who, during the 1990s, had been responsible for 
the Lebanese matters in Syrian establishment) took a different approach – giving the Lebanese state 
more freedom in solving their own issues (to stop the “pilgrimages of Lebanese officials to 
Damascus”167). Bashar, in contrast to his father who tried to curb Hezbollah’s power, decided to tighten 
the relationship with Hassan Nasrallah. Not only did Bashar welcome Nasrallah in Damascus warmly, 
he also enhanced the supply of weaponry to Hezbollah168. 
This rapprochement with Hezbollah had yet another long-term effect on both Lebanon and Syria 
– after the 9/11 events and the launch of American War on Terror, USA became openly interested in 
the issue of disarming Hezbollah and ending the Syrian occupation to Lebanon.169 This has resulted in 
growing international pressure to curb Hezbollah’s activities and coerce Syria into withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon. Colin Powell, visiting Damascus in May 2003, demanded Assad to close terrorist 
organizations’ offices, decommission Hezbollah’s armed groups in Lebanon and support the extension 
of Lebanese army authority throughout southern Lebanon170. Apparently, the War on Terror changed 
the perspective on Syrian presence in Lebanon; it was no longer perceived as “Syrian Peace”, but as 
occupation: the American Congress had started to call upon Syria to “halt Syrian support for terrorism 
[and] end its occupation of Lebanon”. This call was also reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 
11559, calling for Syrian withdrawal and Hezbollah’s disarmament171. 
 Not only external pressure exerted by the USA and the West had influence on Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon: internal circumstances have changed as well. After 15 years, Israel has left southern 
Lebanon. It was primarily because of Hezbollah that the IDF left 2000; paradoxically, the power balance 
in the country has shifted due to that, and Syrian presence was made less and less justifiable. The 
voices calling for Syria’s exit from Lebanon – personification of which was prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri 
– were also growing substantially. 
 Syria did not want to give up that easily – after all, the situation in Lebanon was under control, 
and Hezbollah was easily used as a proxy in fighting Israel, which limited any losses (financial, personnel 
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and otherwise) on Syrian side. Therefore, the assassination of prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 (in 
which Syria never admitted its participation) was the final blow to Lebanese public’s acceptance of 
Syrian presence in the country172. The death of Hariri, for the public quite obviously by the order of 
Assad, sparked the national protest which later on were referred to as the Cedar Revolution.173 These 
events, together with the external (primarily American and French) pressure have caused Syrian troops 
to withdraw on 26th April 2005.174 
 The Cedar revolution has put Hezbollah in a precarious position: firstly, it had to rethink its 
position within Lebanon; secondly, it had to strike a working relationship with Syria within the new power 
balance in the region that the withdrawal had caused. Moreover, the internal power relationship between 
the Assad regime and the Party of God has changed: even though many officials in the Lebanese 
establishment were still pro-Syrian, Hezbollah was no longer the junior partner175 in this alliance. It had 
become a self-sufficient actor in the Lebanese political scene, and its position has been strengthened 
by the “success” in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Therefore, after Syria had withdrawn from Lebanon, 
Hezbollah focused on strengthening its position within the state and tightened its relationship with 
Iran176. The ideological “victory” in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war also facilitated the strengthening of 
Hezbollah’s position in Lebanese politics.  
 Syrian relationship with Hezbollah is seemingly a “marriage of convenience”, where both actors 
had at times conflicting interests but for the past 40 years tried to make the alliance work. The evolution 
of the relationship is quite linear: Syria had started from the position of the local hegemon - already 
present in Lebanon at the time of Hezbollah’s creation. Hezbollah, for Syria, at the beginning came up 
as an interruption, only later to see its potential in being a useful tool for pursuing Assad’s agenda, 
especially in terms of fighting Israel. However, in the over 30 years of the alliance, the power balance 
has evolved – the same way that Hezbollah’s identity and position in the country has changed. At the 
time of Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Hezbollah has been a well-established local actor and 
a fully grown political party. No longer was it just a tool in the hands of the powerful Assad regime – they 
were an important Lebanese player, at the time more invested in the domestic than foreign policy. Syria 
still kept up its ties with Hezbollah, but as reflected in the 2009 Hezbollah’s Manifesto, the Party of God 
had become an entity of its own, with the priority in domestic policies and its own goals abroad. 
 Moreover, the relationship with Syria was from the very beginning based on material and 
logistical support: there was no or little spiritual leadership in this alliance. Syria never supported the 
idea of the Islamic state that the Hezbollah was so into at the beginning of its activity: on the contrary, 
the Syrian regime had been one of the most secular ones in the region. That angle was also a source 
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of conflicts between the Assads and Hezbollah – in the Lebanon they wanted to rule Syrians did not see 
a space for creation of the Islamic state. 
 All in all, motivations for the Syrian-Hezbollah alliance were more connected to the power 
struggle within Lebanon and the geopolitics of the region.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION: THE SYRIA-IRAN-HEZBOLLAH TRIANGLE 
 
 Separate relationships of Syria and Hezbollah and of Iran and Hezbollah had been analysed 
above, however it is the dynamics between all three actors that shape the power balance of the alliance 
and impact the decision making.  
 Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah happens on a different level than the relationship between 
Hezbollah and Iran. Iran is a founding father of Hezbollah, it’s a sponsor in material and spiritual sense. 
Assad’s regime (first Hafez, later Bashar) approach towards Hezbollah is completely different from the 
Iranian approach, even though at first sight they might look similar.  
 It is the agreement between Iran and Syria that builds the foundation for the Hezbollah’s success 
in the region: Iranian financial and ideological support together with the supply routes that Syria was 
willing to deliver in exchange for no interruptions with its agenda in Lebanon. At the beginning the hopes 
that Iran and Syria had in Hezbollah seemed quite similar: they both aimed at using Hezbollah as a tool 
in achieving its foreign policy goals (namely: eradication of the state of Israel) with minimal losses on 
their side (both in terms of troops and international reputation). However, over the years a few things in 
the power balance between the three actors have changed: most importantly, Hezbollah grew and 
evolved to be the dominant local actor, focused on domestic agenda in Lebanon and investing its 
resources in building the country’s independence – on the contrary to fulfilling external actors’ goals. 
This evolution reflects the path that the Hezbollah’s identity went through from its inception to the current 
day – from the radical Islamic guerrilla to the well-established political party in the criticised, but not 
anymore contested system.  
 There is definitely much proof of both Iran and Syria influencing the Hezbollah’s decision-making 
process – both in indirect (providing resources – Iran) and direct (exerting control over the country – 
Syria) ways. However, the power that has been acquired by Hezbollah by “victory” in the 2006 war with 
Israel and by its growing engagement in the Lebanese politics, seemed to shift this balance and to direct 
the Party of God more towards the domestic goals than following foreign agendas. This was reflected 
most explicitly in the 2009 Manifesto, in which Lebanon was referred to as a motherland and the country 
of Hezbollah.  
 Iran had influence on the Hezbollah’s identity construction in its early stages, and in more 
spiritual way: the ideals of the 1979 Iranian revolution were the groundwork for establishment of 
Hezbollah and for the definition of itself, the goals it wants to achieve, the enemies it wants to fight and 
the way it sees the world – as a dichotomy of the oppressors and the oppressed. The Iranian religious 
leadership accepted by the Party of God also impacted the way that Hezbollah had defined itself. In 
case of Syria, the situation is different: the only common goal for Assad and Hezbollah was eradication 
of the state of Israel, while there was no ideological agreement between the actors. The main influence 
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Syria had on Hezbollah’s identity construction is that it permitted creation of a space to continue with 
the resistance project even after the end of the civil war in 1989, therefore it could keep up its resistance 
priority and continue to define itself through the lens of this activity. 
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4. HEZBOLLAH IN SYRIAN WAR 
 
 Hezbollah’s presence in the Syrian war at the time of writing this paper (2016-2018) is 
undeniable. The group has invested significant manpower and resources in supporting Assad’s regime 
in its fight against the rebels. The question remains: what was the decision-making process behind this 
move? How does the fact of engagement in the Syrian war correspond with Hezbollah’s identity 
construction? How does the decision to go to war affect the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s identity? 
 Attempting to answer these questions, the current chapter will look into the state of Hezbollah’s 
actions in Syria, then into the elements of its identity construction described in chapter 2 and the way 
these elements can explain the decision to engage in the Syrian conflict.  
 
4.1 EVOLUTION OF HEZBOLLAH’S PRESENCE IN SYRIA 
 
 Hezbollah has openly joined the Syrian conflict in the early 2013, however the organisation has 
been conducting operations on the ground since 2011177. It has started with issuing a statement 
supporting the regime in May 2011, before the uprising turned violent178. The group, however, went quite 
smoothly from verbal expressions of support to more concrete actions. 
 At first, Hezbollah was serving more of an advisory role179, due to its experience in guerrilla 
fighting and also due to its reluctance to openly engage in the conflict (which was expected to have a 
harmful influence on group’s position in Lebanon). However, as early as the autumn of 2011, reports of 
Hezbollah fighters being killed in Syria started to surface180. There have been other accounts of the 
Assad’s regime utilising Hezbollah fighters for open confrontation with either demonstrators or (at the 
time being) newly formed Free Syrian Army. Rumours from that period were never publically confirmed 
and as difficult to verify, were rebuffed by Hezbollah’s leader, Hasan Nasrallah, as untrue181. 
 Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s engagement continued to expand. Throughout 2012, more and more 
Hezbollah fighters were reportedly present in Syria, both training the regime forces and acting against 
the rebels182. Hezbollah’s tried to keep the deaths occurring in connection to this conflict low profile. 
However, from the funeral of Ali Hussein Nasif in October of 2012, which draw massive public attention 
and presence of substantial crowds, denying the Party of God’s involvement in the war became 
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unfeasible. Hezbollah, however, claimed that Nassif was killed doing his “jihadist duties,” a phrase used 
to obscure the location and activities of Hezbollah martyrs and continued to deny any direct engagement 
in the Syrian conflict whatsoever183. 
 Hezbollah’s role in the conflict escalated significantly during the late 2012 and early 2013, 
enhancing their influence on the battlefield, multiplying fighters sent to direct combat against the anti-
regime forces.184 Hezbollah expertise was needed since they had significant know-how about the urban 
and guerrilla fighting, priceless in the face of the arising civil war185. What is worth noting, Hezbollah 
intensified its operations in Syria parallel to Iran, which officially introduced the Quds Force (IRGC-QF) 
onto the ground in 2012186. These circumstances and the reinforcement of Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah 
axis during this time proves the point of the broader perspective needed for understanding the latter’s 
role in the Syrian civil war. 
  The breakthrough for Hezbollah’s involvement with the Syrian war came with the Al-Qusayr 
offensive, happening between April and June of 2013187. The scale of operation on the Party of God’s 
side was larger than before: according to most sources, up to 1700 fighters were sent to the front at the 
time188. This operation ended in the regime forces (backed by Hezbollah and Iran) success, and 
following that Hezbollah no longer wanted to keep its operations secret: in the speech of 25th May 2013, 
Hezbollah’s leader, Hasan Nasrallah, said: 
 
"We will continue along the road, bear the responsibilities and the sacrifices. This battle is ours, and I 
promise you victory”189 (emphasis added) 
 
Such a declaration meant an open war, with all the consequences arising from this situation. Casualties 
on Hezbollah’s side spiked, meaning that most of the fallen fighters were granted the name of “martyrs” 
and buried with all the appropriate honours190. 
 After the Al-Qusayr offensive, Hezbollah engaged into fights in Aleppo and Homs, however not 
on a large scale191 and without any decisive success. Hezbollah’s fighters actively participated in multiple 
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operations supporting regime’s offensive on Damascus in late 2013192. The group has taken measures 
to reconquer the terrain of Qalamoun, which - being a Syrian-Lebanese border territory with rebellion’s 
strongholds - is strategic to Hezbollah’s own existence. Few of the towns in the province were recaptured 
by regime forces with support from Hezbollah, however – estimating from the numbers of casualties 
within Hezbollah – the group’s engagement has been significantly smaller than in case of Al-Qusayr.193  
 From admitting its involvement in the civil war in 2013, Hezbollah’s scope of engagement varied 
according to circumstances, however its support became crucial for conducting and effective civil war 
in Syria. It became one of the core forces to exert Assad’s regime power over war-torn, conflicted 
country. Tracing the entirety of its operations is unfeasible, however from surfacing reports it is clear 
that the organisation has been primarily used by the regime in urban surroundings for clearing retaken 
cities194 (most recent example of which is the siege of Eastern Aleppo in December of 2016). From the 
fatalities that Hezbollah suffered, the group’s participation in military operations can be deducted: major 
losses in May of 2013 coincides with Al-Qusayr, losses in February 2015 coincide with the ongoing 
combat in Qalamoun, and a general rise in fatalities by the end of 2015 can be correlated with Russia 
stepping into the equation – which caused greater mobilisation on Assad’s allies side.195 
 Summing up, at the end of 2016 Hezbollah deep involvement in the Syrian civil war was 
undeniable. The group has invested major financial and human resources in supporting Assad’s regime, 
despite general disapproval both domestically and regionally. Participating in war seems to have brought 
(even on purely logistics level) more harm than good to Hezbollah – they sacrificed many fighters, among 
them top commanders, and also made some enemies regionally, domestically and worldwide (on that 
below).  
 
4.2 IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR 
 
 As described in detail in chapter 2, Hezbollah’s identity underwent a significant evolution over 
the years. Some pillars of it, however, remain unchanged and the focus for this part of the paper would 
be on confronting those elements with the decision to enter the Syrian conflict.  
 Not so long ago, in 2008, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed that  
 
“Hezbollah does not want to engage in feuds with any regime […] we do not want any bitterness with 
any Arab regime, we do not want any rivalry with any Arab regime, we clearly do not want to engage in 
any conflict with any Arab regime, not security wise, politically or militarily, even in the media”196. 
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This approach has changed no more than three years later, with the Arab uprisings happening all over 
the Middle East. 
 The context of the entire wave of the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East is needed to understand 
the controversy surrounding Hezbollah’s entry to Syrian civil war. There is a visible contradiction 
between its reaction to the Arab Spring in other countries and the strong stance on Syria’s situation: 
 
“Hezbollah was elated by the Tunisian and Egyptian street politics and youth power. In this Arab Spring, 
Hezbollah issued political declarations blessing the Tunisian and Egyptian people in particular, and the 
Arab masses in general, for their drive for ‘freedom and dignity’. Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Sayyid 
Hasan Nasrallah, added ‘… this is the true path when people believe in their resolve… this is the New 
Middle East created by its own people’. He concluded, ‘Your Spring had begun; no one can lead you to 
another winter. Your belief, vigilance, and resilience will overcome all difficulties and make you 
triumphant”197 
 
 Hezbollah’s support for the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East had been selective and dictated 
by its own political interest. The group has supported the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi’a community in 
Bahrain, describing their fight as the resistance against the oppressors (hence subscribing to 
Hezbollah’s most important ideological pillar). However, when people of Syria rose against the Alawi 
regime, Hezbollah reacted in a completely different way198, condemning the uprisings and finally 
engaging militarily. How is the resistance performed by the Syrians different (and less justifiable) from 
all other acts of resistance that had swept the region in 2011?  
 The decision to enter Syrian conflict also contradicted the tendency in Hezbollah’s political 
strategy, expressed best in its 2009 Manifesto – i.e. focusing more on domestic political scene and 
strengthening Party of God’s position within it. Engagement in a foreign conflict, moreover – first in years 
conflict that is not against its main enemy, Israel, but fellow Muslims, appears to be an unexpected 
move. The following paragraphs will position the pillars (elaborated on in chapter 3) of Hezbollah’s 
identity against the decision to enter Syrian civil war – and will show how they do (or do not) correspond 
with it. 
 
4.2.1 RESISTANCE 
 
 Hezbollah is defining itself primarily in juxtaposition to Israel; the core of Hezbollah’s existence 
is built in contrast to the Jewish state and the principles it represents199. After the end of Lebanese civil 
war in the 1990, and the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah took up only one 
more massive direct confrontation with Israel – the 2006 war, deemed as a victory in the Arab world.  
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  As mentioned in previous analysis, Hezbollah applies the discourse in which the world is divided 
in the dichotomy of the oppressors and the oppressed. This dichotomy served the Party of God quite 
well in the first wave of Arab uprisings – as recalled above – where the masses stood up to the 
oppressive regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain. In 2011, at the very beginning of the wave of protest, 
civil disobedience against the regimes sweeping the regions was seen by the Party of God as a part of 
the “resistance project” that Hezbollah’s entire existence had been dedicated to200. The authoritarian 
regimes in the region had been described as serving the American and Israeli interests in the Middle 
East and hence they deserved their fall.  
 The trouble for this rhetoric has arisen when peaceful protests started in Syria and were brutally 
confronted by the regime forces. Hezbollah, despite organising massive rallies of support for the 
revolutions happening in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, kept silent about Syria. It was only in September 
2012 that Hassan Nasrallah confronted the contradictory positions of Hezbollah according the ongoing 
events in the region and explained the reasoning behind this. He declared that the party’s position is 
based on two decisive criteria: first the Syrian regime’s stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict ant the 
readiness of the regime to engage in reform. In Hezbollah’s view, Syrian regime opposition to the Israeli 
state – and support of the Palestinian resistance – was the reason why the Western and Arab countries 
were together engaged in toppling the Syrian regime (as the protests in Syria were seen by Hezbollah 
as motivated by the West). He argued later that the West was engaged in providing weapons to the 
protesters – even though the resistance in the first months was largely peaceful and no organised armed 
forces were formed.201 Moreover, Hezbollah claimed that the Syrian regime was willing to take up the 
dialogue with the protesters: according to Nasrallah, Assad’s regime was ready to engage in reform.202 
It is important to notice, however, that Hezbollah had seen the need to change the way that Syrian 
regime interacted with its citizens prior to the uprisings.  
 
 These examples show that Hezbollah was fully aware of the contradictory position it had been 
presenting in its reactions to the Arab uprisings of 2011. How can this contradictory discourse be related 
to the pillar of Hezbollah’s identity – the resistance? How can one civil disobedience be a part of the 
resistance project, and another – happening in similar circumstances – be described as the evil plot 
against the ideals Hezbollah stands for? 
 There are no simple answers to the questions above, however when looking deeper at the 
concept of resistance in Hezbollah’s identity construction, there is logic in the arguments put forward in 
this instance. Hezbollah, as mentioned above, sees the world as a dichotomy: divided into oppressors 
and the oppressed. All civil disobedience aimed at toppling this imbalance of power is supported by the 
group. However, the resistance against Israel in particular is the most important priority for the Party of 
God. Thus, it can be argued that the resistance in Hezbollah’s understanding happens on multiple levels. 
First one – global -  is the world-wide fight against the oppressors of this world, the crusade against the 
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power imbalance. On a more local level – Hezbollah had dedicated its activities to the ultimate goal of 
fighting Israel and resisting the oppression that this state represents to the Middle East.  
 Along these lines of understanding concept of resistance in Hezbollah identity construction, it is 
worth getting back to the 2009 Manifesto, the milestone of Hezbollah’s transformation from Islamic 
guerrilla into a mature Lebanese political party, in which the Syrian regime was described as having:  
 
“… a distinctive attitude and supported the resistance movements in the region, and stoop beside us in 
the most difficult circumstances, and sought to unify Arab efforts to secure the interests of the region 
and challenges. Hence, we emphasize the need to adhere to the distinguished relations between 
Lebanon and Syria as a common political, security, and economic need, dictate by the interests of the 
two countries and two peoples, by the imperatives of geopolitics and the requirements for Lebanese 
stability and facing common challenges.”203 
 
Syria in this passage is deemed crucial to keeping up Hezbollah’s most important battle – resistance 
against Israel.  
 Resistance understood as a concept happening of various levels is the key to understanding 
how the contradictory stance of Hezbollah on the Arab Uprisings of 2011 could comply with its identity 
formation/evolution. The approval, even enthusiasm (Hezbollah went as far as to organise rallies in 
support of the protests in Egypt and Bahrain in March 2011) was expressed by the Party of God to the 
first wave of the Arab uprisings – and it was because Hezbollah was in favour of the resistance against 
oppression all around the world. The regimes that were first hit by the anti-establishment protests 
(Tunisia and Egypt) were identified in Hezbollah’s view as pro-Western and pro-Israeli – especially 
Egypt, which had been the first Arab country to seek peace with Israel in the 1970s. Hence, the anti-
regime incidents could have been interpreted by Hezbollah as acts against its own arch enemies – the 
United States and Israel. It was “natural” – and therefore in line with the organisation’s identity – to 
support these protests. Analogically, Bahraini uprising, where the oppressed majority of population was 
rebelling against the small group of rulers (happening to be of different Islam branch as well204 ) was 
endorsed by Hezbollah since it represented performing resistance on the global level.  
 Situation had abruptly changed with the outburst of the Syrian uprising. Even though the reaction 
to the protests against Assad’s regime seems contradictory to previous statements about other 
uprisings, it is deeply rooted in Hezbollah’s understanding and performance of the concept of resistance.  
 Hezbollah, despite the significant identity construction’s evolution it went through from its 
establishment in the 1980s, has never changed or given up on its primary goal: destruction of Israel (or 
Zionist Entity, as they prefer to call it). As an organisation, it had been brought to life by the opposition 
to Israel; it was funded and supported in order to fight the Jewish state. The enmity with Israel is at the 
core of Hezbollah existence. Henceforth, when looking at supporting resistance in the case of the Arab 
uprisings of 2011, it is in line with Hezbollah’s identity construction. 
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 The decision to go to Syrian war can be then related to Hezbollah’s identity primary pillar: 
resistance against Israel. Over the years, Syria had an outstanding record of supporting Hezbollah in its 
fights with the Jewish state. It is worth mentioning here that Hezbollah at the time of onset of Syrian civil 
war had been a well-established, independent domestic actor: Syria had been gone for the country for 
6 years and Hezbollah still managed to upkeep its position in the domestic arena. It did not need Syria 
for its survival within Lebanon, on which it had been focusing its policies in the recent years. However, 
Syria was still needed for Hezbollah as its long-standing ally in the harsh no-compromise stance against 
Israel (with most of the Arab states leaning towards some sort of peace agreement with Israel at some 
point). From the Arab countries in the region and beyond, it was mainly Syria who in the 2000s was still 
ready to take a very zero-sum game approach towards Israel. Hezbollah could not allow itself to lose an 
alliance that supported the goal that had been the foundation of its existence ever since. 
 Therefore, Hezbollah’s support for Syria is not that contradictory with its support for other Arab 
uprisings. Resistance is understood as a concept happening on multiple levels: the one closer to home 
had always been a priority for the Party of God. When faced with a choice of supporting the global 
movements of resistance and protecting the crusade it had conducted against Israel for the past 30 
years, Hezbollah has chosen to construct a discourse about joining the Syrian conflict that is faithful to 
the most important pillar of its identity; explaining this decision in such terms, the Party of God is able to 
dedicate itself to support the regime that had proven helpful in achieving this goal.  
 
4.2.2 “LEBANONIZATION” AND DECISION TO MEDDLE WITH OTHER COUNTRY’S AFFAIRS 
 
 Hezbollah, as proved in its 2009 Manifesto, has changed its priorities over the years. It stayed 
faithful to its primary goal – defeating Israel, however it took a 180 degree turn on its stance towards 
Lebanon as a state. As described in chapter 3, from 1982 to 2000s Hezbollah went from contestation of 
the state system and nation state as such, to being incorporated into domestic political scene and 
actively participating in the Lebanese government structures.  
 The decision to stop contesting the existence of the Lebanese state and go into domestic politics 
dates back to Hezbollah’s participation in the 1992 post-civil war elections. Ever since, the Party of God 
had become an indispensable element of Lebanese politics. Its actions were focused on protecting 
Lebanon as a state and even the 2006 “Divine Victory” was a victory in the name of Lebanon. The 
decision to engage militarily in the Syrian conflict was difficult to explain in light of this tendencies. 
Nasrallah justified Hezbollah’s presence as a precaution against civil war in Lebanon –  
 
“If Hezbollah did not fight in Syria, there would have been a Civil War in Lebanon and hundreds of car 
bombs. We did damage control and diminished the repercussions of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon” 205 
 
However, this approach had a few traps on the way. Firstly, Lebanon went quite unharmed by 
the Arab uprisings – it had been experiencing some domestic unrest ever since the 2005 Hariri 
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assassination, therefore protests in various forms were nothing new in the political landscape of this 
country. Lebanon’s problem was not necessarily in the oppressive system of the government, but rather 
in its lack of stability whatsoever. Moreover, Syria had not been present in Lebanon for 6 years at the 
onset of the Arab uprisings – of course the unrest that was happening next door might had caused some 
trouble in Lebanon as well, however the claim that there would have been a civil war without Hezbollah’s 
intervention seems far-fetched (in fact, it is Hezbollah’s engagement that is resulting in more trouble “at 
home”). Hezbollah had built its popular appeal in Lebanon on two pillars: firstly, by providing services 
(water wells, schools, hospitals, broadly understood infrastructure) to impoverished areas of Lebanon 
despite the religious denomination of its inhabitants; secondly, with its long-standing opposition against 
Israel and the readiness to protect Lebanon from the threat that it poses at all costs (as the 2006 war 
proved). 
 Once the decision about going into Syrian civil war went public, major concerns along the lines 
mentioned above rose in Lebanon: 
 
“[Hezbollah] traded accusations with the Western-backed March 14 coalition, which compared 
Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria with the Israeli Defence Forces (…) According to March 14, 
Hezbollah behaved like the IDF by invading and occupying land and encroaching on the ;sovereignty 
and territorial integrity’ of Syria, a UN member country, in order to protect its back (…) Furthermore 
March 14 argue that Hezbollah’s involvement in Syrian civil war was diminishing its availability across 
the Lebanese-Israeli border and its distracting its vigilance in dealing with any Israeli imminent threat”206.  
 
 With the decision to enter the Syrian civil war Hezbollah had majorly undermined the public 
legitimacy it had enjoyed in the 1990s and the 2000s. The entire bottom-up, grass-root work that 
Hezbollah had been conducting since the 1992 election, became a subject of contestation in the 
Lebanese public sphere. Hezbollah was not able to connect its identity of a Lebanese party that acts 
above the religious and social divisions and the fact that it openly engaged in the Syrian warfare on the 
side of the regime.  
 The participation in Syrian civil war had become another milestone in the Party of God’s identity 
construction. With the 2009 Manifesto, with all written down in paper, Hezbollah seemed to have it all 
conceptualised and figured out: it kept up the resistance against Israel and the general oppression as 
its top priority, but this resistance was transformed from the anti-establishment guerrilla into a nation-
making tool207 that allowed Hezbollah to represent itself as a domestic actor, focused primarily on well-
being of the state of Lebanon and its people. The decision to go to the Syrian conflict stood in explicit 
contradiction with this image that had been put forward in the past 20 years. Therefore, the Party of God 
decided to re-create the discourse of its identity and make some other aspects of it more salient than 
the ones just mentioned.  
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4.2.3 PAN-ISLAMISM VS. SECTARIAN STRIFE 
 
 Hezbollah’s religious denomination was very clear from the beginning of its activities in Lebanon: 
by subscribing to the wilayat al-faqih rule, the Party of God made it clear that the branch of Islam it wants 
to follow in its actions is the Shi’a one. The tight relationship with Iran and Syrian Alawis (the sect that 
Bashar Assad belongs to) could have been the reason to consider the group sectarian. In the Syria-
Hezbollah context, there were particular episodes of sectarian support in relations, such as the 
endorsement that prominent Lebanese Shi’a leader Musa al-Sadr gave to Hafez Assad at the beginning 
of his rule: when Syria was discussing its constitution, it kept in power the Article 3 (which state that the 
president must be a Muslim); in 1973, Musa al-Sadr was persuaded to declare Alawis as “Twelver 
Shi’as” (as previously they were considered a part of Islamic heterodoxy) and therefore true Muslims, 
enabling Hafez Assad to become president.208 Despite such ties, both actors were dedicated to a non-
sectarian discourse: Syria focused on secular pan-Arabism, while Hezbollah had prioritised the pan-
Islamic approach in its identity construction and political strategy, subscribing more to the “oppressors” 
and the “oppressed” in its discourse. 
 In the domestic scene, even at the time of contestation of the Lebanese state and fight for the 
establishment of the Islamic state in the broader Middle East, Hezbollah had always emphasized its 
dedication to religious inclusiveness: it had called upon all the oppressed of the world, regardless their 
class or religion, to join the fight for the better world. This view had not changed much after the Party of 
God decided to join the national elections in 1992. Hezbollah, by engaging into local politics, was even 
more able to prove its dedication to acting “above divisions”: it established allies with parties coming 
from different sects, it also provided the grass-root help for many impoverished groups in Lebanon, 
regardless their faith or sect. It became the party that gained following across classes and confession 
in the country. From the 1990s on, Hezbollah also dropped the idea of establishment of the Islamic State 
in the Middle East; it stopped contesting the Lebanese state and it embraced the sectarian system that 
had been in power in Lebanon since 1943 – but worked hard to improve it in its favour. 
 Strong relationship with Iran also directed Hezbollah’s approach towards religion – in the early 
stages it also propagated the idea of the Islamic state, ruled by Sharia and led by the faqih – the 
postulate was to join the secular and religious power in one institution. These postulates were pan-
Islamic – their appeal was meant to reach all the Muslims around the world (and especially in the Middle 
East) and unite them in achieving this goal. Even though Hezbollah not always followed the pan-Islamic, 
tolerant discourse domestically (after all the not-so-clear engagement in the assassination of the Sunni 
prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri had damaged its popularity domestically), in general it had a programme 
of a party that was dedication to inclusion and bridging the gaps in the society. 
 Therefore, the shift in the discourse that happened after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict might 
be surprising. Nasrallah, while confronted with the fact that it had been present in the Syrian combat, 
claimed (among other arguments) that ”Hezbollah’s support for the Syrian regime was not only for the 
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Hezbollah and the Shi’a, but also for Lebanon and all its various religious communities against the 
threats of takfiri forces.”209 The use of the word takfiri  - the infidel – implies a strong, negative religious 
connotation.  
 The employment of the discourse where no longer the fight is conducted against “oppressors” 
but against “infidels”, implies a major shift happening in Hezbollah’s identity construction. The Party of 
God seemed to have lost its pan-Islamic outlook. Using such discourse also means refuting the previous 
cross-sectarian and cross-class approach. 
 It is not to deny the fact that Hezbollah had targeted groups of different faiths before – its primary 
enemies, the United States and Israel come from different religious denomination (respectively from 
Christian and Judaism traditions). What is new in the event of the Syrian civil war is the fact that it is the 
first time when the enmity based on religion is expressed towards the fellow Muslims, even if they follow 
different branches of Islam from the one that Hezbollah subscribes to.  
 Some scholars claim that the event of the Arab Uprisings, especially in Syria, had woken up the 
ancient Sunni-Shiite conflict that had been present in the region for ages. The argumentation here is to 
prove rather that the pre-existing (pre-existing to the civil war, not ancient) sectarian identities have been 
politicised to explain the decision-making behind the decision to go to war. This sectarian discourse, 
however, did not come to use from the very beginning. 
 Syrian opposition at the onset of the protests applied the discourse that invoked national identity 
rather than religious one – they called up for the reform of the regime in the name of a better functioning 
Syrian state210. At this point, Hezbollah – despite its open support for Assad’s administration – also 
called the postulates of Syrian people legitimate and called upon the establishment to consider some 
reasonable reforms. This had changed when the Syrian regime itself started to invoke the sectarian 
undertones in the developing conflict211 – around 2012 Nasrallah was openly talking about fighting the 
takfiris. Since both the regime and opposition in Syria had started to group according to ethno-sectarian 
sentiments, also Hezbollah applied the sectarian discourse. It was also quite an easy explanation in 
domestic arena because of couple reasons. Firstly, the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (the IS) had grown 
to become to most dangerous and prominent threat to both Syrian regime and Hezbollah in the region. 
This fuelled the shift of the conflict from state-oriented to sectarian, as the IS identifies explicitly with the 
radical version of Sunni Islam. Moreover, the broader regional discussion about the conflict became 
sectarian as such: Gulf countries (with Saudi Arabia in the forefront) accused Iran of fuelling sectarian 
violence in Syria by sending troops there and interfering with the sovereignty of Syria212, which coincided 
with Hezbollah’s troops being sent there at similar time. 
 Even though Hezbollah had applied the sectarian discourse to its participation in the Syrian 
conflict, it claimed firmly that its engagement in the Syrian war has the aim of preventing the sectarian 
conflict in the region in the first place:  
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“Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah’s intention in intervening was to decrease sectarian tensions because, 
in his view, the destruction of Shiite shrines could spark revenge and lead to a broader sectarian war in 
the region. [He also stated that] a pre-emptive fight against radical groups inside Syria was necessary 
to prevent these extremists from posing a threat inside Lebanese territory. In both cases, Hezbollah 
denied acting on sectarian grounds, particularly in its messages addressed to non-Shiite audiences.”213 
 
 Hezbollah was invoking its Shi’a identity aspects to gather more following and more recruits to 
be sent to Syria. However, the decision to make the Shi’a aspect of Hezbollah’s identity more salient 
was not an initiative that came directly from Hezbollah: it was rather an adaptation to the discourse that 
was being created by participants of the conflict, as well as regional actors responding to the war214.  
 Referring to specifically Shi’a aspect of Hezbollah’s identity, despite previous inclusive and pan-
Islamic declarations, might have had another reason:  
 
“In the context of the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah’s Islamic identity was not convenient for justifying 
involvement in a conflict that required a fight against other Muslims. This is why Hezbollah and Nasrallah 
tried hard to portray the group’s military intervention in Syria as a move not against Sunni Muslims but 
against “terrorist” and “excommunicators” (referring to ISIS and other extremist groups) that posed an 
existential threat to the region. Similarly, the group rejected charges that it was acting on a sectarian 
basis (…) In Hezbollah’s war in Syria, its defence of Shiite was visible in two ways. First, it protected 
religious sites, such as the Saida Zainab shrine in southern Damascus, that are sacred primarily for the 
Shiite followers of Islam. Second, it fought against the extremist groups, such as ISIL, which follow a 
strict interpretation of Islam and regards Shiites as apostates and rejecters.”215 
 
 The use of sectarian discourse in its reaction to the Syrian conflict and the decision to join it had 
risen the argument that Hezbollah is an explicitly Shi’a organisation working to realise the Iranian agenda 
in the region. The most radical stance is that Hezbollah is committed to preserving Shi’a Islam in the 
region and that existence of radical Sunni armed groups creates a survival threat to this branch of Islam, 
as Alagha puts it: 
 
“(…) for Sayyid Nasrallah to make the extreme decision to be involved in Syria, a decision that he knows 
will be probably fatal to its party’s stand on the Lebanese political scene, ought not to be dismissed as 
just a political mistake, but as a suicide mission, a last cartridge to counter what is certainly perceived 
as a deadly force against Shi’a Islam’s survival in the region.”216  
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214 See earlier in this paragraph. 
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 The Sunni armed fundamentalist groups were a real threat: however, they were not a threat to 
the Shi’a Islam, but to the Assad’s regime. Hezbollah did not come to war with the intention to save Shi’a 
Islam from eradication: it came with the intention to guarantee the survival of its Syrian ally, and the 
sectarian discourse was used as a tool in justification of this decision.  
 
4.3 IDENTITY AND THE JUST CAUSE TO GO TO WAR 
 
As previous paragraphs have shown, Hezbollah tried to create a discourse about its intervention 
in Syria that complied to the pillars of its identity – resistance, focus on Lebanese issues and Islamism. 
These are explanations that might be challenging to defend. Hezbollah was fully aware of that challenge 
and therefore decided to reconstruct its identity in order to justify the decision to enter the Syrian conflict.  
 Hezbollah was able to explain its decision to participate in the Syrian civil war in terms of 
resistance against Israel. Syria had been its biggest ally in the region in most fights against Israel: one 
of not so many left Arab countries taking a radical approach towards the Jewish state. Hezbollah needs 
Syrian regime survival in order to guarantee the continuous support for its goal of defeating Israel and 
returning the land it considers Lebanese (Sheba’a farms) and Syrian (Golan Heights) to its previous 
owners. This explanation seems contradictory with its loudly proclaimed ideals of fighting against all the 
oppression in the world, as the masses in Syria turned against the oppressive regime. It also stands in 
conflict with Hezbollah’s initial support for other Arab uprisings in the region. However, Hezbollah had 
to prioritise what is more important for its own survival and decided to support the actor that could provide 
help in fighting its arch enemy, Israel. 
 The “Lebanonisation” of Hezbollah does not comply with the decision to heavily engage militarily 
in a foreign conflict. Despite using arguments that the unrest in Syria could cause spillover of the fights 
into Lebanon, Hezbollah had hard time explaining the decision to enter Syria as a cause that serves 
Lebanon and its people. On the contrary, it had caused the unrest domestically – both political actors 
and public opinion in Lebanon were heavily against Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria. The domestic 
support had dropped low and Hezbollah had lost many of its followers at home.  
 Hezbollah was unable to create a discourse around its engagement in Syria that would explain 
this decision in terms of its identity build and solidified over the years. The resistance argument is 
defendable, but far-fetched, the explanation that argues that this decision is taken for the benefit of 
Lebanon has not met public’s appreciation. To Hezbollah’s “rescue” came the arrival of the sectarian 
discourse created about the Syrian civil war. 
 In the event of the conflict becoming represented as a sectarian war, and more participants 
defining themselves in terms of religious affiliation, Hezbollah took a bold step to re-create some parts 
of its identity. It had dropped the pan-Islamic outlook that it presented since the onset of the organisation 
(however in different forms: first it was the appeal of creation of the Islamic state, then the cross-
sectarian activities in Lebanon) and decided to make its Shi’a aspect of identity more salient than before. 
It is not to say that Hezbollah had suddenly become more Shi’a oriented: the organisation had been 
explicitly Shi’a by its subscription to the wilayat el-faqih and its close relationship to the Iranian 
leadership. It is in the face of the Syrian civil war that Hezbollah had decided that it will be most beneficial 
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for its interests and survival to join the sectarian discourse around the conflict and make its Shi’a aspect 
of identity the prominent one. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 In 2011, Hezbollah took a risky and at first self-destructive decision to enter the civil war in Syria. 
After the analysis of the organisation’s identity construction, its domestic, regional and international ties 
and how these relate to the decision to join war on Assad’s side, the analysis should help to answer 
research questions stated at the beginning of this paper: 
 How is Hezbollah’s identity influencing its decision to enter the Syrian conflict? Is the Syrian 
conflict, in return, impacting the construction of Hezbollah’s identity? 
 Hezbollah’s identity construction had motivated its actions from the very beginning: the group 
was established in the first place to fight Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and the resistance became the 
foundation of its identity, and its priority in all its actions. This is the most salient aspect of Hezbollah’s 
identity structure, as proven in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 Resistance has been at the core of Hezbollah’s activity both in foreign and domestic policies. In 
foreign policy, the perseverance of Hezbollah in fighting Israel had been ongoing since 1982, and the 
dedication to it gave the Party of God a large local support base. Priority of Resistance allowed 
Hezbollah to make some compromises with some other aspects of its identity – namely, the opposition 
against sectarian system ruling Lebanon – in order to preserve the ultimate goal of eradication of Israel. 
Hezbollah entered the domestic political scene, adjusting to the existing procedure and power allocation, 
but only because this move was making it possible for the Party of God to dedicated fully to the objective 
of resistance against Israel. It was also willing to give up some space in the domestic scene for Syrian 
meddling and domination, as such a powerful ally with a shared enemy created much better opportunity 
for Hezbollah to succeed in fighting the Jewish state. Therefore, the conflict in Syria can be perceived 
by Hezbollah as a threat, not only in material sense, but also from the level of its identity construction. 
 Hezbollah as an actor in Lebanon is not only existing in the domestic context, but also in regional 
one – and so does its identity. Hezbollah is a part of the Axis of Resistance: two other actors involved 
had different influence on its identity construction. Iran, through direct ideological support, had impact 
on how the Party of God perceives religion, interpreted the religious dogmas and how it conducts a 
discourse around Islam. As an additional incentive, Iran is deeply involved in funding Hezbollah, which 
allowed the Party of God to reach its scope as of today. Syria, on the other hand, had more of a material 
influence on Hezbollah (providing supply routes and interfering in Lebanese sovereignty and 
government). On the ideological level, Syria has contributed mainly to the survival of a strong dedication 
to the cause of resistance against Israel. 
The conflict in Syria, then, is a proof that Hezbollah’s identity is both domestic and international 
issue: it affects Lebanon, but it can also affect its allies. It is also a perfect example of the reciprocity 
between identity and the decision to enter the Syrian war. As stated in chapter 4, Hezbollah’s dedication 
to resistance may be an underlying premise on which it decided to take a risky step in trying to save the 
regime tha.t was always sympathetic towards the goal to annihilate Israel. Without Syria, Hezbollah’s 
chances for fighting Israel in case of a conflict grow substantially smaller both on ideological and material 
level. The notion of resistance (the Resistance – own emphasis) have been extended to the struggle of 
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the Syrian regime against the IS217. On the other hand, the event of Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s 
participation in it, created a shift in circumstances that had significantly influenced the construction of 
Hezbollah’s identity and ignited its restructuring.  
 Hezbollah decided to make some previously not exhibited aspects of its identity salient in order 
to justify its presence in Syria. The Party of God gave up its pan-Islamic, inclusive outlook in favour of 
referring to the Shi’a branch of Islam as is strongest motivation and denomination, which turned the 
organisation against other sects that previously supported Hezbollah within Lebanon and externally. 
Implying a discourse in which the Muslim opponents in Syria were referred to as “infidels” also did not 
bring many supporters to its cause. It is not to say that Hezbollah single-handedly is responsible for 
rising sectarian tensions in the region after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011: it is rather to say 
that facing the possibility of not being able to find substantial arguments in favour of its presence in 
Syria, the Party of God decided to join the sectarian discourse that (at this moment) was rising in the 
region.  
 As mentioned in chapter 1, identities are in a constant flux. They undergo construction and 
reconstruction, adapting to both changes from within actors that possess it and from external factors. In 
case of Hezbollah, it had faced a very particular choice: it could stay firmly loyal to the ideals it 
propagated and constructed its identity on for the past decades – resistance against Israel, pan-
Islamism, Lebanon-oriented policies, however standing by its values could not guarantee the group’s 
material survival. After analysing possible benefits and losses, Hezbollah decided to take a controversial 
decision – deconstructing its image in Lebanon and compromising its identity, but this shift was needed 
in order to protect its survival. 
 Hezbollah therefore took a decision that regardless of the conflict outcome, will serve as a 
“breaking moment” in its identity formation. When the conflict ends, the organisation will no longer be 
able to propagate the ideas that it did before the Syrian war: its image as an inclusive, Lebanon-focused 
actors it severely undermined by its actions. In this regard, it is possible to say that the decision to enter 
the way will have impact on Hezbollah’s identity, a bigger than any other event in the past 10 years; as 
Kizilkaya puts it: 
 
“… War can cause identities to be constructed and reconstructed. Creating a new identity usually means 
eliminating a previous one, as seen in the example of Yugoslavia and Bosnia. Changing an identity can 
entail adjusting its content or salience. (…) the content of a just cause to use force is identity dependent. 
In other words, identities possessed by groups or states determine both their ethical consideration of 
the righteous grounds for taking up arms and the way in which they legitimize their decision on war to 
the public. Justification is usually achieved by presenting a positive image of the self while demonizing 
the other side in the conflict.”218 
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This is the kind of justification that Hezbollah used in its explanation of the decision to enter the Syrian 
conflict. Hence, the conflict is not sectarian as such: it is the sectarian discourse that serves best 
Hezbollah’s interest in having the “just cause” for the war.  
 All of this argumentation is not to say that the literature to the day is wrong in ascribing the 
motivations for Hezbollah’s participation in the more material terms: cutting off the supply routes via 
Syria would mean an existential threat to the Party of God. This has been dealt with in the literature 
regarding Hezbollah and its stance of the Arab Spring: this paper has no intentions to undermine this 
analysis. The goal here is more to add an important angle to the analysis and show that identity issues 
are as relevant to the decision-making process as the realpolitik and the will to survive. 
 There are two final conclusions to this argument,. Firstly, the concept of resistance and its 
interpretation is crucial to understanding Hezbollah’s identity and its decision-making logic. Resistance 
has motivated Hezbollah’s actions both in domestic and international arena, and the decision to go to 
the Syrian war is not much different from that. Secondly, the causal relationship between the war and 
identity in this case is that while at the same time identity motivates the decision to enter the conflict, the 
conflict determines the shift in the identity construction. Since the conflict in Syria and actors participating 
in it could jeopardise Hezbollah’s resistance project’s survival, it is considered a “breaking point” that 
could cause Hezbollah to enter the path leading to yet another re-construction of its identity in order to 
have a better ideological ground for justifying its engagement in this conflict. Hezbollah compromised 
some pillars of its existence in order to protect the one it considers core to its own understandings of the 
self. These will not be easily recovered, as well as public’s trust that had been built on this. Hezbollah 
decision to enter the war in Syria seems to have redirected its identity in the durable manner, stepping 
away from the ideals it has subscribed to in the previous stages of its political identity both in Lebanon 
and abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Aleksandra Kalowska, Leiden University 2018 
  student number: 1602349 
 
63 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1. Akbarzadeh, Shahram. “Why Does Iran Need Hizbullah?”. The Muslim World, Vol 106 (January 
2016), 127-140. 
2. Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Identity Construction. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2011. 
3. Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. 
Amsterdam: Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press, 2011. 
4. Alagha, Joseph. “Hezbollah and the Arab Spring”. Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 
Vol. 2 No. 1 (2014), 189-206. 
5. Al-Arabiya, “Hezbollah sends more fighters to Syria after rebels issue ultimatum”, 29th May 
2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/29/Hezbollah-sends-more-
fighters-to-Syria-after-rebels-issue-ultimatum.html 
6. Alfoneh, Ali. “Hezbollah Fatalities in the Syrian War”, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 22nd February 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-
fatalities-in-the-syrian-war 
7. Alfoneh, Ali. “What Is Iran Doing In Syria?”, Foreign Policy, 21st September 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/what-is-iran-doing-in-syria/ 
8. Avon, Dominique, Jane Marie Todd and Anais-Trissa Khatchadourian. Hezbollah: A History of 
the “Party of God”. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012. 
9. Barnett, Michael, and Shibley Telhami (eds.). Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
10. Blanford, Nicholas. “Why Hezbollah has openly joined the Syrian fight”, The Christian Science 
Monitor, 23rd June 2013 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/nasrallah-
hezbollah-syria-speech-rockets.html#ixzz4iae8uEvK 
11. Choucair, Chafic. “Hezbollah in Syria: Gains, Losses, and Changes”, Al Jazeera Centre for 
Studies, 1 June 2016. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/06/hezbollah-syria-gains-
losses-160601093443171.html 
12. Daher, Joseph. Hezbollah: The Political Economy of the Party of God. London: Pluto Press, 
2016. 
13. Daher, Joseph. “Hezbollah, Syria and the Arab Uprisings” (blog post), 
https://www.plutobooks.com/blog/hezbollah-syria-and-the-arab-uprisings/  
14. DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study of How State 
Sponsorship affects Terrorist Group Decision Making”. Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 6. Issues 
4-5 (October 2012), 85-107. 
15. DeVore, Marc R. and Armin B. Stahli, “Explaining Hezbollah’s Effectiveness: Internal and 
External Determinants of the Rise of Violent Non-State Actors”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
27:2 (2015), 331-357. 
16. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond Hinnebusch. Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System. London/New York: Routledge, 1997. 
  Aleksandra Kalowska, Leiden University 2018 
  student number: 1602349 
 
64 
 
17. El Husseini, Rola. “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria”, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, no.5 (2015), 803-815. 
18. Gabil, Rober G. “Has Hezbollah Rise Come at Syria’s Expense?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 
14 Issue 4 (Fall 2007), https://www.meforum.org/articles/2007/has-hezbollah-s-rise-come-at-
syria-s-expense 
19. Gause, F. Gregory. “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf”. 
Security Studies, 13:2, (Winter 2003), 273-305. 
20. Goodarzi, Jubin M. Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East. 
New York, London: IB Tauris, 2009. 
21. Kessler, Oren. “Syria Uprisings Stir Old Divisions in Neighboring Lebanon”, Jerusalem Post, 10 
August 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syria-uprising-stirs-old-divisions-in-
neighboring-Lebanon 
22. Kizilkaya, Zafer. “Identity, War and the Just Cause for War: Hezbollah and Its Use of Force”, 
Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 28 No. 2 (June 2017), 80-105. 
23. Morillas Bassedas, Pol. “Hezbollah’s Identities and their Relevance for Cultural and Religious 
IR”. Barcelona: Institut Catala Internacional per la Pau, December 2009. 
24. Nasrallah, Hassan (author), Nicholas Noe and Nicholas Blanford (eds.). Voice of Hezbollah: 
Statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah. London: Verso, 2007. 
25. Palmer Harik, Judith. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London/New York: IB Tauris, 
2005. 
26. Phillips, Christopher. “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria”. Third World Quarterly, 36:2 (2015), 
357-376. 
27. Qassim, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within. Michigan: Saqi, 2005. 
28. Reuters, “Arab League labels Hezbollah terrorist organisation”, 11th March 2016. 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-arabs/arab-league-labels-hezbollah-terrorist-
organisation-idUKKCN0WD1IB 
29. Rousseau, David L. and Garcia-Retamero, Rocio. “Identity, Power and Threat Perception: A 
Cross-National Experimental Study”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51 no. 5 (October 
2007), 744-771.   
30. Samii, William Abbas. “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria 
Relationship”. Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008), 32-53. 
31. Shay, Shaul. “Hezbollah” in: Wars from Within: Understanding and Managing Insurgent 
Movements, edited by Albrecht Schnabel. London: Imperial College Press, 2015, 373-406. 
32. Stein, Janice Gross. “Threat Perception in International Relations” in: The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Psychology, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O Sears and Jack S. Levy, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, 364-395. 
33. Sullivan, Marisa. “Hezbollah in Syria”, Middle East Security Report 19, Institute for the Study of 
War (April 2014), 1-41. 
34. Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.  
  Aleksandra Kalowska, Leiden University 2018 
  student number: 1602349 
 
65 
 
35. Wiegand, Krista Eileen. “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political 
Party”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32:8 (2009), 669-680. 
36. Wood, Josh. “Hezbollah Offering Direct Help to Syrian Army, Rebels Say”, New York Times, 
17th October 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/world/middleeast/hezbollahs-hand-
seen-backing-the-syrian-army.html?pagewanted=all 
37. Yahel, Ido and Or Honig. „The Father’s Success and the Son’s Failure: Explaining the Growth 
of Lebanon’s Resistance to Syria’s Invisible Occupation”. Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 
26, no.1 (2016), 127-149. 
38.  “7 Hezbollah Fighters Killed in Syria”, YaLibnan, http://yalibnan.com/2011/09/02/7-hezbollah-
fighters-killed-in-syria/ 
 
 
 
